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ABSTRACT
Recently a growing literature studied the possibility of beneficial brain drain 
(BBD) through stimulating domestic human capital formation. The first essay explores a 
new and potentially more important mechanism of BBD through return migration within 
a framework of Romer-Jones R&D-based endogenous growth. A key premise is that 
skilled emigrants may return to the home country to seek entrepreneurial opportunities 
given a suitable domestic business environment and bring back new knowledge from 
abroad. Surprisingly, under fairly general conditions, the model predicts that benefits 
from knowledge gain through return migration can overweigh the loss from brain drain in 
the long term, leading to eventual convergence. A numerical example is provided to 
calculate the speed of convergence. Available emigration data from the US and New 
Zealand are supportive of the positive effect of skilled return migration on economic 
growth.
By calibrating a parsimonious Solow model augmented by natural resources, the 
second essay offers a simple explanation of the “labor scarcity paradox” during the 
process of America’s catching up with Britain, which static models have difficulties in 
accounting for so far. A numerical simulation mimics the US overtaking the UK around 
1900 in per capita GDP.
The Needham puzzle asked why China lagged technologically in the modem 
world despite its impressive lead in premodem time. Existing explanations fall into two 
categories, demand failure or supply failure. The third essay discusses and dismisses two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
supply-side hypotheses based on scientific revolution or rent seeking and proposes that 
the lack of formal legal institutions such as patent protection is an important missing link.
A Poisson regression and a negative binomial regression are applied to two 
datasets of major invention counts for the US and 14 Western European countries during 
1750-1950 and 1590-1900 respectively. The data point to a significant positive effect of 
patent laws on invention rates, after controlling for each country's economy size. This 
result is robust in different specifications of cross-country fixed effects and/or random 
effects models and after dropping the UK and the US from the sample.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
THREE ESSAYS IN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS





© 2007 Qiang Chen
DEKALB, ILLINOIS 
AUGUST 2007
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3279176
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
®
UMI
UMI Microform 3279176 
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Certification: In accordance with departmental and Graduate 
School policies, this dissertation is accepted in 
partial fulfillment o f degree requirements.
Dissertation Director
/ L A  2 h , Z o g
Date
any use of ^ . A cknowledged.
HEREIN MUST BE DUL g g  OBTAINED
THEAUTHOR'S P ^ k l o K u B U S H E D  OR
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to Professors Carl 
Campbell, Susan Porter-Hudak, and George Slotsve for their numerous 
constructive suggestions and great supports.
The author also wishes to thank seminar participants in the Economics 
Department at Northern Illinois University and the Midwest Economics 
Association Conference for their comments.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES.........................................................................................................  vi
LIST OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................  vii
LIST OF APPENDICES.................................................................................................. ix
Chapter
1. BRAIN DRAIN, KNOWLEDGE GAIN AND CONVERGENCE....................  1
Introduction................................................................................................ 1
A Framework of R&D-Based Endogenous Growth.................................. 6
Brain Drain, Knowledge Gain and Convergence.....................................13
The Speed of Convergence: A Numerical Example................................ 32
Cross-Country Empirical Evidence from the US and New Zealand 39
Policy Implications................................................................................  44
Conclusion............................................................................................... 45
2. THE LABOR SCARCITY PARADOX: A GROWTH THEORETIC 
APPROACH....................................................................................................... 47
Introduction............................................................................................. 47
The Central Role of Natural Resources in American Industrialization... 52
The Solow Model Augmented by Natural Resources............................ 56
Calibration of the US and UK Economies in 1870 ................................. 61
Numerical Simulation for the US and UK Economies During 1870- 
1913.......................................................................................................... 67
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VConclusion.............................................................................................  70
3. THE NEEDHAM PUZZLE RECONSIDERED: THE ROLE OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS................................................................................................. 71
Introduction............................................................................................. 71
How Important Was the Scientific Revolution?..................................... 76
Was Rent Seeking Important?................................................................ 81
The Modes of Invention: Then and N ow ................................................ 84
A Simple Model of Inventor’s Choice.................................................... 86
Cross-Country Evidence of Patent Laws’ Effect on Invention Rates 93
Could James Watt Be a Chinese: A Case Study.....................................118




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Calibrating an Example Economy ............................................................... 34
2. Regression of Growth on Skilled Return Migration from U S .....................  41
3. Regression of Growth on Skilled Return Migration from New Zealand  43
4. Labor’s Income Shares in the US and the UK ................................................  62
5. Education of British Inventors During the Industrial Revolution ................... 79
6. Sample Countries’ Major Inventions and Patent Laws................................... 101
7. Regression Results for 614 Inventions During 1750-1950 ............................... I l l
8. Regression Results for 115 Inventions During 1590-1900 .............................  116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page
1. Growth Rates Under Autarky ........................................................................... 15
2. Growth Rates with Brain Drain but Without Return Migration...................... 17
3. Brain Drain with Return Migration Under A + ^  < 1 ...................................... 26
4. Convergence of the Developing Country to the Developed Country.............. 37
5. The US and UK GDP per Capita in 1820,1870 and 1913 ............................  48
6. The US and UK Populations in 1820, 1870 and 1913...................................  49
7. The US and UK Real Interest Rates During 1801-1899....................................  50
8. Simulation of the US and UK Capital Stocks per Efficiency U nit..................  68
9. Simulation of the US and UK GDP per Capita During 1870-1913 ..................  69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure
Page
10. Log of GDP per Capita for China and Western Europe During A.D. 0-1998 
............................................................................................................................ 72
11. Populations of China and Western Europe During A.D. 0-1998 .......................  76
12. The Total Numbers of Inventions for All 15 Countries During 1750-1950 .... 102
13. The Total Numbers of Inventions for All 15 Countries During 1590-1900.......103
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix Page
A. SKILLED RETURN MIGRATION FROM US IN 1990 ...............................  135
B. MACROECONOMIC DATA DURING 1990-2000 ........................................136
C. SKILLED RETURN MIGRATION FROM NEW ZEALAND IN 2001 ........  137
D. MACROECONOMIC DATA DURING 2000-2005 .......................................  138
E. SIX HUNDRED FOURTEN INVENTIONS FROM STREIT (1954) 
............................................................................................................................ 139
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I
BRAIN DRAIN, KNOWLEDGE GAIN AND CONVERGENCE 
Introduction
The conventional view about brain drain is that it is bad for the home country. By 
definition brain drain means the exodus of human capital from a poor country to a rich 
country. Insofar as human capital is important for economic development (Lucas 1988), 
brain drain without any positive “feedback” may contribute to a “poverty trap.” From 
the perspective of the sending country, it is a lost investment that makes those left 
behind worse off and may reduce both the home economy’s growth rate and income 
level (see for example, Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). A natural policy implication is to 
restrict the outflow of talented nationals by taxation or other means.
How extensive is brain drain? Carrington and Detragiache (1999) showed that for most 
countries, people with a tertiary education have the highest migration rate. Docquier and 
Marfouk (2005) estimated that the stock of skilled emigrants in OECD countries in year 
2000 is high in the Philippines (1.13 million), India (1.04 million), Mexico (0.92 
million), China (0.82 million) and Vietnam (0.51 million), and in relative terms (in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
proportion to the educated labor force), the emigration rates exceeds 80% in small 
countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, Haiti, Grenada and St. Vincent. The rate of skilled 
migration exceeds 50% in the following five African countries: Cape Verde, Gambia, 
Seychelles, Mauritius and Sierra Leone. It is worth noting that developing countries 
with large stocks of skilled emigrants may exhibit low rates of emigration. This is 
obviously the case of India (4.3%), China (3.8%), Indonesia (2.1%) and Brazil (2.2%).
However, even casual observations suggest that most foreign students in the US are 
from fast-growing economies, such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and so on. 
Can brain drain ever be beneficial? Some recent studies have explored the causation 
from brain drain to faster growth in the home country (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 
1997, 1998). The hypothesis is that the opportunity to emigrate raises the returns to 
human capital investment (i.e., education or professional training) in the home country. 
The very existence of brain drain therefore raises the pay-off from education, giving an 
additional incentive for more people to get better education. If this ex ante investment 
effect outweighs the ex post loss of human capital, then “beneficial brain drain” (BBD) 
occurs. Beine et al. (2001, 2003) offered the first empirical support that this may not be 
a mere theoretical curiosity.
But how important this particular form of BBD is empirically is still in doubt. One 
critical assumption in this BBD literature is that the return to human capital investment 
is very low in developing countries. The possibility of emigration enhances this return 
to schooling. However, it seems that the reality in developing countries is that many
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
people cannot afford the cost of education despite plenty of motivation. For example, 
Psacharopoulos (1985) showed that the returns to human capital investment are 
typically higher in developing countries than in advanced countries.
This essay proposes a new and potentially more important mechanism of BBD through 
return migration. So far, the contributions of return migration to economic growth have 
largely been ignored in the literature (Santos et al., 2003, is a notable exception) 
because return migration is usually very small. For example, Liao and Tang (1984) 
found that one fifth of undergraduates in the field of science and technology in Taiwan 
went abroad and only 10% of them returned after completing their study. This is 
understandable due to the huge income gaps between developing and developed 
countries. According to World Bank,1 in 2005, the US per capita GDP is 6 times that of 
China, 12 times that of India, and 40 times that of Congo. Even compared with those 
newly industrialized countries in East Asia, such as South Korea, the US per capita 
GDP is twice as high. Although the income gap between skilled labor in developed 
versus developing countries may be smaller, it is certainly still sizable, which is a major 
cause in the recent rise of outsourcing. Therefore, only a small portion of emigrants, 
presumably those hardcore patriots, ever returns. However, being insensitive to 
economic incentives, these hardcore patriots are not interesting subjects for economic 
analysis.
1 Numbers are computed from data taken from the World Bank’s website at 
www.worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html.
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Nevertheless, this paper argues that even a small percentage of return migration can 
make a big difference. The logic is simple. For example, if only one person returns 
among 10 emigrants, then there is a net loss of 9 units of human capital at the face 
value. But this very person who returns is very likely to bring back new ideas or 
technologies from an advanced foreign country. Because research and development 
(R&D) is typically expensive, it may be the case that even if all 10 units of human 
capital stay home to engage in closed-door R&D, they may not be as productive as what 
the single returning migrant can bring back from abroad. After all, it is usually much 
cheaper to borrow technologies from abroad than to re-invent everything from scratch 
locally. Prominent examples of beneficial brain drain through return migration include 
Taiwan and Israel and recently India and China. In 1980, the Taiwan government 
established the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park to specifically attract overseas 
talents, which has become known as the Taiwanese “Silicon Valley.”
Take the example of Taiwanese immigrant Miin Wu who arrived in the US in the early 
1970s to pursue graduate training in electrical engineering. After earning a doctorate 
from Stanford University in 1976, Wu saw little use of his new skills in economically 
backward Taiwan and chose to remain in the US. He worked for more than a decade in 
senior positions at Silicon Valley-based semiconductor companies including Siliconix 
and Intel. By the late 1980s, Taiwan’s economy had improved dramatically, and Wu 
decided to return. In 1989 he started one of Taiwan’s first semiconductor companies, 
Macronix Co., in the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park. Macronix went public on 
the Taiwan stock exchange in 1995 and in 1996 became the first Taiwanese company to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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list on NASDAQ. It is now the sixth biggest semiconductor maker in Taiwan, with 
more than $300 million in sales and some 2,800 employees (Saxenian, 2002).
Motivated by this class of retuming-entrepreneur phenomena, this paper makes a key 
assumption that overseas students and skilled professionals return to seek 
entrepreneurial opportunities in their home countries. In this way, their incomes are 
only limited by the profits of their “high-tech” firms and are free from the constraint of 
the huge unfavorable wage gaps between the developing and the developed countries. 
Their firms’ profitability in turn depends on how friendly the business environment is, 
which offers a number of policy instruments for the home country, such as tax breaks, 
less corruption or regulations, better infrastructure, and so on.
Certainly, returning professionals who didn’t become entrepreneurs may also play an 
important role in speeding up their native country’s human capital accumulation, 
especially those who work in the education sector. But this doesn’t happen very often, 
especially when the income gap is very large. Even when it happens, it is more likely 
due to noneconomic factors such as home consumption bias. Santos et al. (2003) 
provides such a model where temporary emigrants’ home consumption bias2 is low 
enough that they would emigrate in the first place, but after accumulating human capital 
abroad, their home consumption bias is high enough that they prefer to return to their 
home country. In this way, the knowledge/technology gap between the developing and 
developed countries would shrink to a steady-state gap, but it won’t disappear. So the
2 An alternative interpretation is the ability to learn or accumulate human capital in a foreign country.
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mechanism of BBD in Santos et al. (2003) does not imply convergence even in the 
long run.
In this paper, we focus on returning entrepreneurs who are not constrained by how big 
the income gap is or the magnitude of their home consumption bias, at least in principle. 
Since we can’t model everything all at once, we ignore those nonentrepreneur returning 
professionals. Surprisingly, this BBD mechanism through returning entrepreneurs as 
developed in this paper does imply convergence under very general conditions.
A Framework of R&D-Based Endogenous Growth
Traditional analysis of brain drain usually focused on its impact on the sending 
country’s stock of human capital and income level and was not explicit about its growth 
effect. We depart from the traditional approach by focusing on the long-run growth 
effect instead, which is arguably more important than short-run loss or gain of human 
capital or income level. Clearly, an exogenous growth model is unsuitable for such a 
task, since the growth rate is fixed and exogenous by definition. Turning our attention to 
endogenous growth models, there are basically two types of endogenous growth 
models. The first type focuses on human capital as an engine of growth (Lucas, 1988; 
Rebelo, 1991) and an escape from the diminishing return to physical capital. However,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
given the amount of knowledge in a society, the long-run growth rate of human capital 
per capita can be nothing but zero (Romer, 1990). An approach along this line (e.g., 
Santos et al. 2003) would have to rely on delicate parameter configurations to explain 
why migrants would ever want to return to their home country after having accumulated 
more human capital abroad.
The second type of endogenous growth model focuses on knowledge creation through 
explicit R & D  (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Jones, 1995). Technically, this 
paper is based on the R&D-based endogenous growth models pioneered by Romer 
(1990), with an important modification by Jones (1995) to remove the counterfactual 
scale effect (i.e., growth rate doubles with the doubling of R&D input). Whether R&D- 
based growth models are appropriate for describing developing economies is a question. 
After all, they were initially created to explain the growth of advanced economies. In 
principle, there are only two ways to create new knowledge in a closed economy: 
through costless learning by doing or through purposeful, costly R&D.  History shows 
that learning by doing itself is not a sustainable engine of growth. For example, China 
stagnated despite its large population to engage in learning by doing (Lin, 1995). It is 
now almost a consensus that R&D is the engine of modern growth. In any case, the 
developing country’s R&D sector shall be mostly viewed as an R&D imitation sector 
dedicated to study and adapt foreign technology to its own factor endowments and local 
environment. As such, the developing country’s R&D imitation activity may not be 
fully included in the standard R&D statistics.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Consider a developing country and a developed country described by a model similar to 
Jones (1995). The differences between these two countries are threefold: the developing 
country has a lower initial human capital stock, a lower initial level of knowledge, and a 
less efficient government in providing law and order, infrastructure, etc. (the meaning 
of which will be made precise below) than the developed country.
Let’s focus on the developing country first. There are three sectors in the economy 
populated by infinitely lived agents: a perfectly competitive final goods sector, an 
intermediate goods sector with a continuum of monopolists, and an R & D sector. Time 
is continuous. In contrast to Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), we assume that labor is 
used in the final goods sector only, and human capital is used in the R & D  sector only. 
This simplification is justified since we are not concerned with allocating human capital 
between the final goods sector and the R & D  sector. Both labor and human capital are 
assumed to grow at the constant rate of n.3 The production of the final goods sector is 
given by the “love-of-variety” functional form:
Y = 6L a £* x)~a di , (1.1)
where Y is the final good, L is the labor force, x is the intermediate good indexed by 
is the current knowledge level (also the current number of intermediate
3 As the developing country assimilates more knowledge from abroad through returning entrepreneurs, its 
rate of human capital accumulation may also speed up. This would even strengthen the main result in this 
paper. For simplicity, we ignore this possibility.
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capital goods), and 6 e (0,1] is an indicator of government efficiency. Apparently, 
inefficient governmental provision of good institutions and infrastructure lowers firms’ 
output. For the advanced country, 6 is set to 1.
We normalize the price of final goods to unity and let p t be the rental price of 
intermediate good xi . The profit of the ith final good firm is given by:
Then profit maximization implies an inverse demand function for intermediate good:
x;, after obtaining a patent from the R & D sector. Suppose an intermediate firm rents
generic capital goods from consumers at the interest rate r and then transforms them 
into intermediate goods on a one-to-one basis, discounted by the government efficiency 
index 6 . Then its profit maximization problem is:
( 1.2)
p t = 0 (l-a )L ax:a V ie  [0,A], (1.3)
The intermediate sector is composed of an infinite number of firms on the
interval [0, A]. Each of them is a monopolist in providing a particular intermediate good
max pi6xi -  rxt , (1.4)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Anticipating the conditional demand from the final goods sector, this monopolist’s 
optimization problem can be readily solved to yield:
r (1.5)
2  _
xi - x  — [#(1 -  «■)]« r aL Vie[0,y4], ( 1.6)
_  _  / -  i - -  r ini - K -  a(  1 - a )  a 6 ar aL Vz e [0, A\ , (1.7)
where p , x , and n  denote the corresponding optimal values. By symmetry, all
_  r
intermediate goods would be set at the same monopoly mark-up price, p  = ---------- ,
0(1 -  a )
and provided at the same amount x , which grows proportionally with the labor force L. 
Each monopolist in the intermediate sector also makes the same profit, k  , which grows 
proportionally with the labor force but depends positively on government efficiency.
Finally, new knowledge is created in the R & D sector according to:
where 8 is a constant coefficient, H  is the human capital stock, 0 < X < 1 and 0 < 1.
A = 08HxA<t>, ( 1.8)
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Note that the restriction of (j) < 1 is necessary to remove the counterfactual scale 
effects in Romer (1990), where growth rate is proportional to the level of human capital. 
The compensation to human capital wH is determined through the zero profit condition 
of a typical R & D  firm.
k k d  =  P A9 8 H XA *  -  w h H  = 0 , (1.9)
wh =Pa68A*Hx~\ (1.10)
where PA is the price or market value of a new patent. Correctly foreseeing an 
intermediate monopolist’s profit flow , the R & D firm sets PA to extract the 
present value of this profit flow since the intermediate sector is monopolistically 
competitive. Viewing the purchase of a new patent as an investment, then the “no 
arbitrage condition” between different investment opportunities requires:
r = —  + ^ - .  (1.11)
Pa Pa
From equation (1.11), it is easy to see that on the balanced growth path, the steady-state 
growth rate of PA must equal the growth rate of an intermediate firm’s profit, which is
p
the same as the labor force growth rate n, i.e., —  = n . This can be proven by
Pa
P 7tcontradiction. If —  < n , then the term —  in (1.10) will blow up, and there will be no 
P a P a
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p  _
steady state. On the other hand, if —  > n , then k  = 0 in the steady state, and all
Pa
patents become worthless. Therefore, in equilibrium PA grows at the same rate as Jz and 
is given by,
PA= —  - 0-12)r — n
The consumer part of this model is the same as in the standard neoclassical growth 
model. A representative consumer maximizes:
^ ----- -e-(p-n)'dt, (1.13)
1 —<7
which leads to the usual equilibrium condition of consumption growth:
(1.14)
c a
The R & D equation (1.8) pins down the growth rate of A. Rewrite equation (1.8):
(1.15)
A Al~* K J
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Given this model, it is easy to show that there exists a globally stable balanced 
growth path (i.e., H x and A1^  must grow in the same rate), and the steady-state growth 
rates of knowledge, per capita output, per capita capital and per capita consumption are 
all the same and proportional to the human capital growth rate n:
g = - ^ -  = gy =gk =gc- (1-16)1 - (p
The steady-state interest rate is determined through equation (1.14):
r = p  + gcr. (1.17)
Combining equations (1.10), (1.12) and (1.16), it is easy to show that the human capital 
compensation, wH, also grows at the rate of g.
Brain Drain, Knowledge Gain and Convergence
With the above framework, we are now in a position to explore the issues related to 
brain drain and reverse brain drain by extending it to a two-country setting. For 
simplicity, we ignore international trade. We also exclude the possibility of 
international capital mobility so that the interest rate is determined inside each 
economy. For countries at a low level of development, their financial markets may not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be very developed and may be heavily regulated by their governments, hence less 
integrated into the world capital market. However, during the process, a developing 
country catches up with advanced economies; this assumption may become 
problematic. At the other extreme, if we assume perfect capital mobility such that the 
interest rate of a “small, open” developing country is completely determined by the 
interest rate of a “large, open” developed country (say, the US), then there are several 
paradoxical results as shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) within a neoclassical 
growth framework.4 These paradoxes include infinite speed of adjustment of the capital 
stock, consumption per efficiency unit tending to zero asymptotically, and asset per 
efficiency unit becoming negative asymptotically. Some sorts of constraints on 
international credits are needed to resolve these paradoxes. But the credit-constrained 
open economy again behaves like a closed economy in some sense (Cohen and Sachs, 
1986; Barro et al., 1995). In reality, we rarely see that a country’s interest rate is 
completely determined by the “world interest rate.” As long as there is a significant 
component of the domestic interest rate that is determined inside its own economy, our 
assumption of zero international capital mobility helps abstract us from unnecessary 
international finance complications, so that we can focus on delivering our central 
message about the transmission of knowledge through return migrants.
First, consider the case of autarky as a benchmark. In autarky, a country’s growth rate 
depends on its human capital growth rate and other exogenous parameters. So these two
4 The reduced form of an R&D-based endogenous growth model is still a neoclassical growth model, 
after the endogenous rate o f technical change is pinned down.
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A?lcountries will grow at the same rate , ,5 but the developing country would never
\ - (p
catch up with the developed country due to a lower initial knowledge level and lower 
initial human capital stock. Therefore the proportional gap in absolute income level 
remains constant, as illustrated in Figure 1.
g
An
Figure 1. Growth rates under autarky.
Second, consider open economies with brain drain but without the possibility of return 
migration.
5 This is consistent with the fact that the growth rates of developed and developing countries are roughly 
the same in the twentieth century (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), with the growth rates of 
developing countries sometimes slightly higher (perhaps thanks to assimilating knowledge from 
developed countries).
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Compared with autarky, the situation apparently just gets worse from the perspective 
of the developing country. We assume that only human capital is qualified to migrate 
(so nonhuman capital labor force cannot migrate). Furthermore, we assume that a fixed 
proportion (3 of the developing country’s human capital emigrates to the developed 
country at any point in time. The fixed emigration proportion [3 can depend upon both 
the developed country’s policies (e.g., immigration or visa quota) and the developing 
country’s policies (e.g., political restriction or penalty fee).
Assuming a fixed emigration ratio of /? is a sensible first approximation because if [3 
is increasing unbounded towards unity, then it would eventually exhaust all of the 
sending country’s human capital stock (possibly also exceed the capacity of the 
receiving country to accept immigrants), which is an extreme situation. If j3 is 
increasing but approaches an upper bound strictly less than unity asymptotically, then 
we would just relabel this upper bound /?, since we are most interested in the long-run 
effects. Similar arguments can be made for the case where [3 is monotonically 
decreasing. Therefore, a fixed (3 is a suitable assumption for long-run analysis.
Therefore, at time t, the outflow of “brain drain” is (3H{)eni, where H 0 is the developing 
country’s human capital stock at time 0, which grows at the constant rate of n.
Skilled migrants are chosen randomly by the destination country through lotteries. The 
decision to emigrate is obvious. Any “human capital” who wins the lottery to go abroad
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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will go. Without loss of generality, we ignore the one-time fixed cost of migration. In 
this case, although the human capital growth rate is still the same, the home country is 
left with an even lower initial stock of human capital. The opposite happens to the 
developed country. While its human capital growth rate is still the same (since both the 
native component and the immigrant component grow at the same rate), its absolute 
level jumps to a higher level. Therefore, the gap between these two countries would 
become even bigger during transition dynamics, although in the steady states they 






Figure 2. Growth rates with brain drain, but without return migration.
Third, consider the most interesting case of brain drain with the possibility of return 
migration. As discussed earlier, it is not realistic to expect return migration to happen
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because of shrinking income gaps (often 10 times or more) between these two 
countries. To make it worse, adverse selection due to asymmetric information can also 
deter return migration; i.e., domestic employers do not have enough information to 
distinguish more capable return migrants from less capable ones than foreign employers 
(Kwok and Leland, 1982). However, after being exposed to the advanced economy and 
its state-of-the-art knowledge and technology, emigrants now have the option to bring a 
new design to manufacture in their home country. Due to the huge gap in the knowledge 
level, there are certainly many such opportunities to exploit. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that while reaping the monopolistic profit flow given by equation (1.7), they 
do not need to pay any licensing or patent fee to the inventors in the developed country. 
This is without loss of generality. One reason is that all patents have only limited 
lengths. For example, it is 17 years in the US. Second, paying a certain licensing fee or 
incurring some imitation cost will not weaken this model as long as it is cheaper than 
reinventing the technology in the developing country.
On the other hand, human capital who stayed in the developing country (i.e., those who 
have never gone abroad) cannot utilize foreign knowledge because of asymmetric 
information and the fact that much technical know-how is tacit and it takes a trip and an 
extended stay in the developed country (either as a student or an employee) to grasp this 
implicit knowledge. In this way, former emigrants become important potential 
messengers of technological transmission, as the new designs they brought back directly 
add to the developing country’s knowledge base. Compared with foreign direct 
investment, returning entrepreneurs do not face the language, cultural and social
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First consider the effect of brain drain on the destination country. Since it doesn’t 
change the developed country’s human capital growth rate, it has no impact on its long- 
run growth. However, it does give a positive shock to the developed economy to jump 
to a higher growth path during the transition dynamics. Therefore, everybody in the 
advanced economy would be better off in the long run, despite some short-term pain 
due to structural adjustment (i.e., a higher human capital stock would temporarily 
depress skilled labor’s market compensation. See, for example, Borjas, 2006). This was 
one reason why Gary Becker (2005) in a recent article in Wall Street Journal called for 
a more friendly immigration policy towards foreign professionals.
Now consider the emigrants’ decision to return or not. Abstracting from all social and 
cultural factors, we focus on comparing the income streams that either staying in the 
developed country or returning home can bring.
Now consider an emigrant who arrives at the developed country at time t. After a fixed 
period of learning and being exposed in the advanced economy, he or she is eligible to 
return to his or her home country as an entrepreneur. To tell a clean story, we set this 
fixed period to zero without loss of generality. Setting it to a positive period, say 5 years 
or 10 years, will not change the long-run growth effects that we are most concerned 
about but will make the notation a bit messy. Furthermore, it is not important to 
explicitly specify what migrants do during their stay in the advanced country. It doesn’t
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matter whether they go to school or work in the R&D sector; it suffices for our 
purpose that they would gain enough technical know-how so as to bring back a new 
product design if they choose to, and by the time they make a return migration decision, 
they are “good” enough to work in the R&D sector of the advanced country if they 
choose to. Therefore, if this emigrant stays in the developed country, his income stream 
is given by:
where s is a time variable, A indicates the developed country, and w0 is the developed 
country’s compensation to human capital in the R&D sector at time 0. Notice that 
equation (1.18) is only an approximation. With “brain gain,” the advanced economy’s 
short-term growth rate is going to be higher than the steady-state growth rate g . 
However, since the developing country only has a smaller human capital stock to begin 
with, and only a small portion of it is “siphoned off’ to the developed country, this 
approximation is sufficient for our purpose to the extent that few emigrants would 
decide not to return simply because there are many fellow countrymen in the developed 
country to make his prospect of future staying much brighter. The current “subjective” 
value of this income stream at time t if staying is:
(1.18)
(1.19)
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where rj e (0,1) is introduced to account for home consumption bias,6 which is a 
common assumption in the micro literature of migration (see, for example, Djajic and 
Milbourne, 1988). If an emigrant chooses to return as an entrepreneur, his income 
stream is given by the profit flow given in equation (1.7) in principle. However, we do 
not observe everybody return because not everybody can become a good entrepreneur. 
Therefore, we assume that each unit of human capital is bom with an index of 
entrepreneurial ability ae  £/[0,l], which is drawn randomly from a uniform distribution 
between 0 and 1. There is no self-selection bias of different entrepreneurial endowment 
since all human capital would prefer to emigrant if given the chance with or without a 
high entrepreneurial ability, since emigration implies a higher present value of income 
whether the migrant stays in the advanced country temporarily or permanently. It is 
further assumed that the profit flow that returning human capital is able to achieve is 
proportional to their entrepreneurial ability. Specifically, the flow of profit accruing to a 
typical returning entrepreneur is given by:
7is -  aa{i -  a) « 6 ar aLs -7r0ens, (1-20)
-  i-1where 7ro{a,0) = aa{ 1 - a )  a 6ar aL0 depends on both a and 0 positively. We assume 
perpetual monopoly, and hence this profit flow lasts forever. This assumption can be 
easily relaxed to model the erosion of monopoly power over time as proposed by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004), but it will not change the basic flavor. Hence the current
6 This is not a critical assumption. We put it here to be consistent with the micro migration literature.
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value of his profit flow at time t is:
( 1.21)
Assume that for an individual with foil entrepreneurial ability (i.e., <ar = 1 )  and a 
sufficiently high value of 6 the current value of returning is greater than staying, i.e., 
CVRT > CVST. This is a sensible assumption since a capable returning entrepreneur may
make more money than an average wage-earner in the developed country. Alternatively, 
he could stay in the developed country to become an entrepreneur. But given our model 
setup, he would not make a positive profit by doing so, whether he owns an R&D firm 
or an intermediate firm.
Obviously, when a = 0, CVRT -  0 < CVST. Then by the intermediate value theorem, 
there exists an a* e (0,l) such that individuals with a* entrepreneurial endowment will 
feel indifferent between staying and returning, i.e.:
Then every emigrant with a > a* will return, whereas the rest stay. Note the dependency 
of a* on time in general. This is because while 7ts grows at the rate of n, ws grows at
( 1.22)
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*the rate of g  = ------ . Only when A + </> = 1, does n - g ,  and a is fixed over time
1 -0
unless government efficiency 0 changes (assuming that interest rates are fixed in the 
steady state by the relation r = p  + g o ). If A + 0 < 1 (the most plausible case as argued
below), then n> g , and the growth of n s continues to outpace ws, reducing a* over
time to zero at the rate of so that in the limit everyone returns. (During this
process the developing country’s income converges to that of the developed country as 
shown below.) This is consistent with the stylized fact that as the income gap shrinks, 
more and more migrants choose to return to their home country. When the income gap 
is sufficiently small, then everybody returns or they would not emigrate in the first 
place (imagine the case of Japan).
On the other hand, if A + <p> 1 (an unlikely case), then n < g , and the growth of k  s 
continues to lag behind ws, increasing a* to unity over time, so that CVRT < CVST and 
nobody returns.
Notice that a depends inversely on government efficient parameter 6 , which depends
on the fixed costs of setting up a business (getting licenses, etc.), infrastructure, the
financial system and capital markets, tax breaks, governmental regulations, corruption,
special economic zones, business environment and so on. Note that the dependency is
very sensitive, and a small change in #can bring about a large change in a . For
2 1example, in the benchmark case of a  = —, a is proportional to — .
3 6
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Therefore, the flow of return migration at time t is (1 -  a )(5H()em. Recall that at time t, 
the outflow of “brain drain” is pHaent, leaving (1 -/J )H 0em units of human capital in
the developing country. For simplicity, we assume that each returning entrepreneur 
brings back one new design of capital good without loss of generality. Hence, the 
growth of knowledge in the home country consists of two parts: indigenous production 
through R&D with remaining human capital and borrowed technology through skilled 
return migration:
(1.23). With this new equation of knowledge growth, will the developing country 
eventually catch up with the developed country? This is the focus of the remaining 
analysis.
Rewrite equation (1.23) in terms of percentage growth:
(1.23)
Notice that both effects of “brain drain” and “knowledge gain” are reflected in equation
(1.24)
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It is easy to see that on the righthand side of equation (1.24), the first term grows at 
the rate of A n - ( I -  <f>)g and the second term grows at the rate of n — g  (treating a as a 
constant for the moment).
Case 1. A + (f><\ (the most plausible case)
In this case, the second term in (1.23) dominates the first term, since for 0 < A < 1:
n -g > A {n -g )> A n -{ \-( /))g . (1.25)
Furthermore, as argued earlier, under A + 0 < 1, a tends to zero in infinity, and the term 
(1 -  a )  goes to 1 in infinity, so it wouldn’t give us any trouble. Then the steady-state 
growth rate of knowledge in the developing country is determined by the second term:
g = n (1.26)
which assures that the developing country will eventually grow faster than the 
developed country until it catches up, since:
g = n > g=  T ^7 - (1-27)1 - 0
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Essentially, under A-V(p<\, the R & D  production function is not very “powerful” so 
that benefits from “knowledge gain” are eventually enough to outweigh losses from 








Figure 3. Brain drain with return migration under A + (p < 1.
But what happens in the short run? It is ambiguous. The developing country’s growth 
rate may immediately accelerate or first decelerate and then accelerate, depending on 
government efficiency 6 and emigration rate , among others. From equation (1.23), 
we can see that a positive short-run growth effect requires:
( 1.28)
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Also note the government efficiency 6 may be endogenous and depends positively on 
the rate of return migration (1 -  a ) , as more returned migrants wield influence and 
persuasion or even take up government posts directly.
Why is X + 0 < 1 the most plausible case? Recall that X and 0 are parameters in the 
knowledge production function A = 6SHX (equation 1.8).
(1) As pointed out before, 0 < X < 1, which occurs when there is either duplication in 
research efforts (e.g., several firms engage in the same research), or as the size of R &
D personnel grows, its average quality declines (e.g., Ph.D.s from the top 10 
universities are of higher quality on average than Ph.D.s from the top 100 universities).
(2) As mentioned earlier, 0 < 1 is necessary to eliminate counterfactual strong scale 
effects. Actually, 0 < 0 represents the case of “fishing out”; i.e., as those easy 
discoveries are made first, it becomes increasingly difficult to create new knowledge.
On the other hand, 0 > 0 represents a positive external effect, i.e., old knowledge aids in 
the production of new knowledge. Therefore a natural benchmark is 0 = 0, without any 
positive or negative external effects. If 0 < X < 1 and 0 = 0 or is sufficiently close to 0, 
then X + 0 < 1.
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(3) A + (j)< 1 corresponds to the case of decreasing returns to scale when both human 
capital and current knowledge are considered inputs. On the other hand,
A + 0 > 1 signifies increasing returns to scale (the possibility of A + (p = \ will be 
discussed next), which makes the knowledge production function so “powerful” that 
“strange” things happen (e.g., as discussed above, “nobody returns in the limit”).
(4) A and 0 are called by Romer (1990) “philosophical parameters” that are virtually 
impossible to estimate separately. However, a combination of them may be estimated.
For example, Alcala and Ciccone (2002) estimated = 0.20, which implies that
1 -0
A + ^ <5A + </> = \. Hall and Jones (1999) obtained an even lower estimate in which 
A = 0.05, which implies A + 0 < 20A + 0 = 1. It appears that A + 0 is not only less
1 - 0
than 1, but actually far less than 1.
For the above reasons, we will restrict our attention to the case A + </> < 1 for practical 
purposes. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that although an eventual catch-up and 
convergence is inevitable under this scenario, it may take a very long time, and its 
impact on the developing country’s short-term growth rate is ambiguous. Whether brain 
drain can become beneficial immediately or how soon it takes depends critically on the 
rate of return migration (1 -  a ) , upon which government efficiency 6 exerts a big 
influence. In the next section, we conduct a numerical example on the speed of 
convergence to demonstrate this dependency explicitly.
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Also notice that if government efficiency 6 is low, then many emigrants would stay 
in the developed country “permanently” (or only return at a distant date). Over time, its 
total size can become quite large. For example, by the end of the 1990s, Chinese and 
Indian engineers were running 29% of Silicon Valley’s technology business, and the 
pace of immigrant entrepreneurship has accelerated dramatically in the past decade 
(Saxenian, 2002). The power of this international reserve of human capital can be 
unleashed if the government of the developing country can improve its efficiency#, 
which seems to be the case for India and China recently.
Notice that divergence is still possible under X + (/) < 1 at least for a period of time. First
of all, if nobody returns (1 -  a = 0), then it is definitely a divergence like in Figure 2.
Second, if only a small number of people return, 1 -  a ~ 0 (or too small), then the 
developing country would suffer initially, until the second term of return migration 
starts to dominate the first term in absolute terms. Third, for the convenience of 
analysis, we have ignored the time period that an emigrant needs to stay in the 
developed country to acquire necessary human capital to become a returning 
entrepreneur. So during this period (say 5-10 years), the impact on the developing 
economy would be negative.
Notice that this model predicts convergence, but not leapfrogging. As the developing 
country gradually catches up with the developed country, it would become increasingly 
difficult to find a new idea in the developed country that hasn’t been imitated in the
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A A
home country, since A ~ A . Also, with A ~ A , the incentive to emigrate also 
disappears, and this mechanism of “brain circulation” would stop.
Also, if we allow returned skilled labor to go back to the domestic R & D  sector, this 
will give additional boost to the domestic economic growth. Foreign-trained R & D  
personnel may master more knowledge than their home-groomed colleagues, i.e., like 
“virtual knowledge” only in their heads since the domestic economy still cannot 
produce the corresponding intermediate goods.
Case 2. 1 + 0  = 1
In this case, the second term in (1.22) still dominates the first term, since for 0 < 1 < 1 
we have n -g >  A (n -g )> A n -(  1 - 0 )g . However, in the steady state, both countries
Amwill grow at the same rate since g = n and g = ------= n . During the short-run
1 -0
transitional dynamics, the result is ambiguous.
Case 3. 1 + 0 > 1
In this case, the first term dominates the second term, i.e.:
n-g< A n-{\-< /j)g . (1.29)
Then the steady-state growth rate is determined by the first term:
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g = T ^ 7 '  O-30>
\ - d >
This can be readily proven by contradiction. Under X + (/) > 1, if the second term 
dominates the first term instead, then n -g >  X n -(  1 - (fi>)g and g  = n hold 
simultaneously. Combining them together yields 0 > n(X + $ - 1), which contradicts 
X + (j) > 1. Furthermore, as argued before, under X + <f> > 1, eventually nobody returns; 
therefore, (1 -  a )  tends to infinity, making the second term even smaller over time. 
Equation (1.30) indicates that the developing country will grow at the same rate as the 
developed country in the long run. However, whether the developing country can still 
grow faster in the short term and enough to eventually catch up with the developed 
country is ambiguous. Most likely the income gap would even widen in this case. 
Because the knowledge production function A -  dSHxA4‘ is more powerfiil under 
X + (j> > 1, the damage to new knowledge production is more acute with the loss of 
human capital through brain drain. To make it worse, our previous analysis shows that 
given a fixed government efficiency 6 , the rate of return migration becomes smaller 
over time. If the benefits from return migration do not come very fast and sizable, then 
the developing country may further drift apart from the developed country in terms of 
knowledge levels; i.e., divergence happens.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Speed of Convergence: A Numerical Example
32
In this section, we want to calculate the speed of convergence, i.e., how long it would 
take for the developing country to catch up with the developed country in terms of the 
knowledge level, hence per capita income level.
Recall that the fundamental differential equation governing the growth of knowledge in 
the developing country is:
A = se[{ 1 -  P)H0ent f  A* + (1 -  a)j3H0ent, (1.23)
which doesn’t admit an analytic solution unless 0 = 0 , under which (1.23) becomes a 
first-order linear ordinary differential equation that can be readily solved. Apparently,
0 = 0 is not a bad assumption, since it corresponds to the neutrality of old knowledge in 
the production of new knowledge after balancing the effects of “fishing out” and 
“standing on giants’ shoulders.” Although the case of 0 ^  0 can be tackled numerically, 
it is unlikely to yield much additional insight by the continuity argument. Hence we 
focus on the case of 0 = 0 to estimate the speed of convergence.
For simplicity, we assume the following (standard textbook) calibration values in this
2
exercise. The labor of share of income a  is assumed to be —. The degree of relative 
risk aversion <7 is set to be unity, reducing the period utility function to be logarithmic.
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The time discount rate is p  = 0.05 , and the growth rate of both the human capital and 
labor force is n = 0.02. The proportion of skilled emigration is set somewhat arbitrarily 
to /? = 0.1, and the home consumption bias is assumed to be rj = 0.5. With little 
information about X , we set X ~ 0.8. This implies that the per capita income growth is 
Xabout = 80% of the population growth rate, which is consistent with stylized facts.
\-<t>
We normalize the human capital stock at time zero (H 0) and knowledge stock at time
zero (Aq ) in the developing country to be unity and set its labor force at time zero ( L0)
H  ~to be 100, which implies —-=  1%. For the developed country, we set A0 = 20
A>
H  7and L0 = 50, which implies -^-=10% and there is 20 times difference in knowledge
A
and income level initially. Finally, the knowledge production parameter S is set to be 
0.09 to match the initial growth rate in the developed country to its steady-state growth 
rate. Table 1 summarizes these calibration values.
7 In 2003, there were 15,689,000 Americans with bachelor’s or above degrees in science and engineering, 
according the National Science Foundation data available at www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c3/tt03- 
01.htm. In the same year, the American civilian labor force was 146,510,000, according to Bureau of
Labor Statistics data available at www.bls.gov. This implies H0/ L0 =  12% (we assume 10% for 
simplicity).
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Parameter Values Explanation
2a -  — 
3
Final good production parameter (labor)
8 = 0.09 Knowledge production parameter
A = 0.8 Knowledge production parameter (human capital)
0 = 0 Knowledge production parameter (knowledge)
o  = 1 Degree of relative risk aversion
p  = 0.05 Time discount rate
n = 0.02 Growth rate of human capital and/or labor force
(5 = 0.1 Proportion of skilled emigration
7 = 0.5 Home bias discount in consumption
H 0 =l Developing country’s human capital stock at time 0
4 = 1 Developing country’s knowledge level at time 0
ooIIo Developing country’s labor force at time 0
H0 = 5 Developed country’s human capital stock at time 0
4  = 20 Developed country’s knowledge level at time 0
Z0 =50 Developed country’s labor force at time 0
2
8 is chosen to be 0.09 so that ~  0.016 , which matches the equilibrium growth rate.
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XnThe above calibration implies g  = ------ = 0.016, r = p  + og = 0.056, and
1 -0
r = p  + crg = 0.07. (For simplicity, we use the equilibrium value of g — n in this 
approximation.) Then (1.23) becomes:
A = 0.096?[o.9e°02']°8 + (1 - a  )0.1e002' . (1.31)
Now we need to determine a . From (1.10), we can estimate w0:
% = /V » o ~ ' = 0 .0 9 x ^ - H ? *  =6.71.r — n
From (1.22), we see that a* (the indifference level of entrepreneurial ability between 
returning and staying) is determined by:
r \  r — n
\ r ~ g y a{ 1 -  a )
2- a \  2
0.45
.3 0 . 0 0 4 ?  ’
d aL / n~'s)t 6 e
(1.32)
It is easy to see that in order for a* < 1 (i.e., strictly less than unity for return migration 
to begin at time zero), it is necessary that 6 > 0.77. For 0 < d < 0.77, return migration 
won’t happen until time T{0), where:
T (0) = 250(ln 0.45-3 In 6). (1.33)
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For example, if 6 = 0.5, then return migration won’t start until 320 years later, which 
is probably not realistic. Therefore, we focus on the case of 6 > 0.77 .
Now we plug this value of a* in (1.32) back into differential equation (1.31):
A = 0.099[0.9e»” ' ]“  + (1 ■- - £ 4 L ) 0 .
tf e
Rearranging, we get:
A  = 0 .0 8 3 0 - 0.045
03
\




f  2.81 \ ( ,  2 .8 05.19 e  4 + 5.190----- =-
I  & J l  o 3 J
0.016/ , c^ 0.02/+ 5el (1.36)
I f 0 = 0.8, then A, =-2.66-1.34e00ia +5e002t.
If 9 = 0.9, then At = -4.82 + 0.82e0016' + 5e0 02' .
If d = 1, then A, = -6.38 + 2.38e0016' + 5e002r.
On the other hand, the knowledge level in the developed country is:
A1=Aoe00l6t w ith io = 20.
If 9 = 0.8, then the time to catch up t is determined by,
(1.37)
-  2.66-1,34eom6t* + 5eomt* = 20e0016'* => /*L=0.8= 363 years. (1.38)
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If 6 = 0.8, then the time to catch up, t , is determined by:
-4.82+0.82e°'016'* +5e0 02'* =20e°'01(t' => t*\e=os= 336 years. (1.39)
If 9 = 1, then the time to catch up, t , is determined by:
-6.38+2.38e0016'* +5e002'‘ = 20eom6t' => t’|,=l = 315 years. (1.40)
The dynamics of convergence under the above parameter values is showed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Convergence of the developing country to the developed
country (in log of GDP per capita when 9= 0.8, 0.9, or 1). The overtaking part
of this figure shall be ignored since the model ceases to apply after convergence.
The speed of convergence around 350 years may not seem so unreasonable if we 
consider the following:
(1) The initial gap of knowledge level (hence per capita income) was 20 times.
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(2) In autarky, no convergence would ever happen.
(3) The target of convergence -  the developed country is a moving target.
(4) Skilled return migration is the only catch-up mechanism considered in this model, 
whereas in reality there are other potentially more important catch-up mechanisms at 
work, such as foreign direct investment and international trade.
(5) In reality, some countries either never converge or drift farther away from the 
developed country.
One can appreciate more the benefits from skilled return migration to know that the net 
benefit is positive from day one for all 6 > 0.781 (under our “unrealistic” assumption of 
migrants possibly staying zero time in the advanced country). This can be demonstrated 
by looking at:
A | „ i „ , , „ = 0 . 0 8 3 « - ^  +  0 . 1 > j 0| _ , ^ = 0 . 0 W  (V f? > 0 .7 8 1 ) .  (1.41)
For example, if 6 = 0.8, then A^\migration= 0.0785 > A0\atJlarky= 0.072. (Note that the initial
growth rates are higher before they settle into the stead- state growth rates of 0.02 and 
0.016 under migration and autarky respectively.)
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Cross-Country Empirical Evidence from the US and New Zealand
Although there is anecdotal evidence in support of the growth-enhancing effects of 
return skilled migration, we look for a cross-country dataset to test the contribution of 
return migration to economic growth empirically.
Skilled Return Migration from US
However, a formidable barrier is that there is no uniform system of statistics on the 
number and characteristics of international migration (Carrington and Detragiache, 
1998). Emigration data are even worse than immigration data, as the latter is available 
from census but usually the former is only available through a residual technique. For 
example, Ahmed and Robinson (1994) calculated the expected foreign-born population 
in US in 1990 based on the number of foreign-born persons enumerated in the 1980 
census, adjusted by life table survival rates. An estimate of emigrating during 1980- 
1990 was obtained by the difference between the counted foreign-born population in the 
1990 census and the above-expected population. Following a similar strategy, Mulder et 
al. (2002) provided updated estimates of foreign-born emigrants during 1980-1990 for 
only 14 developing countries. Among these 14 developing countries, four are from Asia 
(India, Iran, Korea and Philippines),9 six from Central America (Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamacia, Trinidad & Tobago), and four from South America
9 China and Taiwan were combined together and had to be dropped from this dataset.
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(Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). All African countries were grouped 
together and therefore dropped from this dataset since the number of migrants was very 
small compared with other countries.
However, since the total number of emigrants was inferred, no information about their 
educational attainment was available. I have to assume that emigrants have the same 
structure of educational attainment as immigrants to the US for the same country of 
origin. The ratios of skilled immigration in total immigration are taken from Carrington 
and Detragiache (1998) to estimate the number of skilled emigrants and the rate of 
skilled return migration. See Appendix A, Return Migration Data.
Macroeconomic data are relatively easy to get. Data of real per capital GDP in 1990 and 
2000 were obtained from Penn World Table Mark 6.1, from which the annual growth 
rates during 1990-2000 were calculated. Average years of schooling in 1990 were taken 
from Barro and Lee (2001). See Appendix B, Macroeconomic Data.
I ran a standard cross section growth regression in the spirit of Barro (1991) and Sala-i- 
Martin (1997), with the log of per capita GDP 1990, the average years of schooling and 
the rate of return skilled migration as explanatory variables. The OLS estimation results 
are below. Regressing the growth rate during 1990-2000 on the rate of return migration 
in 1990 helps avoid the reverse causation from growth rate to rate of return migration. 
See Table 2.
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Table 2
Regression of Growth on Skilled Return Migration from US
GRATE =-0.0080 + 0.0015 LGDP + 0.0005 ED + 1.2187 MIG
(0.099) (0.013) (0.004) (1.091)
n = l4 ,K = 4 ,  R2 = 0.11 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Note: GRATE = annual per capita GDP growth rate during 1990-2000 
LGDP = log of per capita GDP in 1990 in 1996 constant price 
ED = average years of schooling in 1990 
MIG = rate of return skilled migration in 1990
Because it is a small dataset and it is largely concentrated in Central and South 
America, the R2 is quite low (only 0.11), and the coefficient on the log of per capita 
GDP in 1990 is insignificant and has a wrong sign (it is slightly positive, but it should 
be negative according to conditional convergence implied by neoclassical growth 
theory). The coefficient on average years of schooling has the right sign but is also 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the rate of return skilled migration has the 
right sign, but it is only statistically significant at the 14.5% level (one-tailed t test).
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Despite the poor data quality and possible endogeneity (higher growth rate attracts 
more return migrants), the most surprising finding is that the rate of return skilled 
migration outperforms the two standard regressants in cross-country growth regressions 
-  the initial levels of income and the education.
Skilled Return Migration from New Zealand
Since 2001, New Zealand has required migrants leaving New Zealand to fill out 
departure cards that include information about their nationalities and occupation and 
whether they were on temporary or permanent departure. Hence this provides a direct 
measure of skilled return migration. Unfortunately, being a small immigrant country, 
only nine developing countries are specified in this New Zealand dataset, and most of 
them are from the Asia-Pacific region. Also, since immigrants to New Zealand only 
constitute a small portion of worldwide immigration, there is a question of how well 
skilled return migration from New Zealand can proxy for skilled return migration from 
all advanced (e.g., OECD) countries.
I grouped three occupations to make an operational definition of “skilled migration”: 
“administrators and managers,” “professionals,” and “technicians.” Also, I generated 
the stock of immigrants by adding up all skilled immigrants to New Zealand from 1981- 
2000 and subtracting all emigrants from 1981-2000. Then I used the structure of skilled 
versus nonskilled immigration in 2001 to estimate the stock of skilled immigrants. Data 
are listed in Appendix C and Appendix D. The regression results are found in Table 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
Table 3.
Regression of Growth on Skilled Return Migration from New Zealand
GRATE = 1.1762 -0.0083 LGNI - 0.0067 ED + 0.5236 MIG
(0.112) (0.017) (0.005) (0.576)
n = 9, K= A, R2 = 0.53 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Note: GRATE = annual per capita GNI growth rate during 2000-2005 
LGNI = log of per capita GNI in 2000 in PPP 2000 dollar 
ED = average years of schooling in 2000 
MIG = rate of return skilled migration in 2001
Although it is still a small sample, the R2 has improved to 0.53 compared with the US 
emigration data. Both the initial income level and average years of schooling are not 
significant, and their coefficients are virtually zero. The coefficient of the rate of return 
skilled migration has the right sign, but it is statistically significant at 16% (one-tailed t 
test). However, it is remarkable that again the rate of skilled return migration 
outperforms that of initial income level and schooling, which are usually quite robust 
explanatory variables in cross-country growth regressions. Obviously, we can’t draw 
too many conclusions from these two small datasets. But at least these regression results
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are consistent with and supportive of our model’s prediction of a growth-enhancing 
effect through skilled return migration of skilled labor. More data and empirical 
research are obviously needed.
Policy Implications
Clearly a central policy implication from this model is that a developing country can 
and should utilize return migration as an effective mechanism to catch up with 
developed countries. Developing countries should do all they can to attract oversea 
skilled nationals to return to their home countries, particularly to improve the business 
environment and government efficiency, such as infrastructure, tax incentives, ease of 
regulations, government transparency etc. Accordingly, efforts to stop brain drain is 
ineffective and may be counterproductive with “beneficial brain drain.”
A few further remarks:
(1) Infrastructure: While it may be difficult to boost infrastructure throughout the whole 
country, it is much easier to do so in a special economic zone or industrial park. It is 
also easier to offer tax breaks and easy regulations within a special zone. Hence it is 
potentially doable for many developing countries, especially those with a coastline and 
ports.
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(2) Government: Government has an important role to play besides improving its 
efficiency. For example, the Taiwanese government set up the Hsinchu Industrial Park 
and aggressively promoted the recruitment of overseas talents. Government can also 
play a crucial role in fostering a domestic venture capital industry (Saxenian, 2005).
(3) Policy implications for developed countries: The phenomenon of “brain 
circulation” is a win-win situation. While some foreign skilled workers return to their 
home countries permanently, many more may stay in the developed country. Even those 
who left may still maintain close business ties with the developed country in promoting 
trade and economic cooperation. Some people may divide their time between two 
countries and become “transnational astronauts” (who often fly in the air). Furthermore, 
a world that is less polarized is certainly more conducive to economic and political 
stability and peace.
Conclusion
Instead of restricting brain drain passively, developing countries can have a more 
constructive approach to encourage return migration through a friendly business 
environment. This is a win-win outcome for both the developing and the developed 
countries. Within a framework of R&D-based endogenous growth, this model predicts 
catch-up and eventual convergence under fairly general conditions. Brain circulation 
may become a strategy for developing countries to catch up with the advanced
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countries. However, the speed of convergence depends on government efficiency in 
providing physical and institutional infrastructure and financial incentives. Directions 
for future researches include finding better and more complete data of return migration 
and determining specifically which government policies can promote return migration 
of skilled labor.
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CHAPTER II
THE LABOR SCARCITY PARADOX:
A GROWTH THEORETIC APPROACH
Introduction
The rapid development of American industrialization in the nineteenth century and its 
finally surpassing Britain at the turn of that century have intrigued many scholars for 
decades. According to Maddison (2001), the US GDP per capita was only three quarters 
that of the UK in 1820. But by 1913, the US GDP per capita was about 8% higher than 
the UK’s. Apparently, the US income level caught up with the UK around 1900 (see 
Figure 5 below).
In his original thesis, Rothbarth (1946) surmised that this was largely due to America’s 
abundant land and hence scarce labor (see Figure 6), which gave an incentive to install 
labor-saving equipment. Rothbarth proposed that in any country where land is available 
in large quantities, labor is likely to be expensive because the income of the industrial 
worker must be sufficiently high to present an attractive alternative to his cultivating the 
land. Thus the high productivity of labor in American industry at the beginning of this
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century can be explained by the fact that industry had to install labor-saving 
equipment. This hypothesis was further expanded and formalized by H. J. Habakkuk 
(1962), which established the conventional argument that America used more 
machinery10 because of labor scarcity.
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Figure 5. The US and UK GDP per capita in 1820, 1870 and 1913 (in 
1990 international $). Data source: Maddison (2001), p.185, Table Al-c.
10 It has also been proposed that America used “better machines” instead o f “more machines”
(Habakkuk, 1962). But “there were no American restrictions o f the export o f technology at the time. If 
the American System were truly better, then the British should have adopted it....Since they did not adopt 
American technology, this would seem to be proof that the 'better machines’ argument is false” (Atack 
and Passell, 1994).











Figure 6. The US and UK populations in 1820, 1870 and 1913. 
Data source: Maddison (2001), p. 185, Table Al-a.
This hypothesis was seriously challenged by Peter Temin (1966), where he for the first 
time introduced a formal model into the discussion. In his two-sector (agriculture and 
manufacturing), three-factor (capital, labor, and land) model, labor scarcity necessarily 
implies capital abundance; in other words, higher wages must be accompanied by lower 
interest rates. Although real wages in America were estimated to be about 30% higher 
than in Britain (Rosenberg, 1967; Adams, 1970; James and Skinner 1985), the real 
interest rates in the United States were also consistently higher than in Britain during 
most of the 19th century (see Figure 7). Therefore, Temin was led to a startling 
conclusion that America was actually labor abundant.
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Figure 7. The US and UK real interest rates during 1801-1899. Source: Nominal 
interest rates are from Homer and Sylla (2005). Prices are from Historical 
Statistics of the United States (1975) and British Historical Statistics (1988).
However, Fogel (1967) showed Temin's specification to be unsatisfactory for failing to 
take into account the linkage between agricultural and manufacturing sectors. At the 
heart of Temin’s model were the assumptions that agricultural output was a function of 
labor and land only while manufacturing output was a function of labor and capital 
only. Fogel (1967) pointed out that “firms employed in the processing of agricultural 
commodities account for more than 50 percent of the value added by the manufacturing 
sector in 1860” (p. 301). In this way, manufacturing output uses agricultural output as 
an input, and therefore uses land as an input indirectly. Fogel (1967) showed that 
Temin’s argument would not go through under this modified model specification.
Summers and Clarke (1980) broadened the discussion to include international trade and 
capital flows. They showed that if factor supply was given, the relationship between 
labor scarcity and capital intensity could not be established. They turned their attention
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to variable factor supply — capital inflow from abroad and long-term savings 
behavior. They agreed that international trade between America and Europe was 
minimal at that time, which meant that America did not import much physical capital, 
just liquid capital, the effects of which seemed only to increase America's money supply 
instead of the supply of capital goods. So the controversy still remained.
James and Skinner (1985) mounted an ambitious effort to resolve this paradox once and 
for all. Using 1849 US census data, they constructed a three-sector (agriculture, skilled 
manufacture, and unskilled manufacture), four-factor (capital, land, skilled labor, and 
unskilled labor) general equilibrium model to explain the following three empirical 
regularities for the antebellum period: “1) the United States was relatively capital 
intensive only in a limited number of manufacturing industries; 2) both the nominal and 
the real wage rates were higher in the United States than in Britain; and 3) both the 
nominal and the real costs of capital were higher in the United States than in Britain” (p. 
517). The key point of their model is that while capital and natural resources are 
complementary in the skilled manufacturing sector, this relationship is not present in the 
unskilled manufacturing sector. Therefore, while the US skilled manufacturing sector 
was more capital intensive than in the UK, the manufacturing sector overall (dominated 
by unskilled manufacturing in the US at the time) was still less capital intensive than the 
UK. As a result, the US had both a higher real wage and a higher real interest rate 
around 1850.
However, despite its complexity and the careful general equilibrium simulation, James
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and Skinner’s model was nevertheless static (i.e., it only models the US and UK 
economies around 1850, but not over time) and therefore missed the broad picture of 
American industrialization process and comparative American and British performance 
in the nineteenth century, which was the original focus of the Rothbarth-Habakkuk 
thesis. Their reliance on “skilled labor” to explain the labor scarcity paradox is also 
somewhat unsatisfactory, as “skilled labor” is usually endogenous in the long run but 
was treated as given in James and Skinner (1985).
This paper therefore focuses on the dynamics of US and UK economies in the 
nineteenth century as a complement to the detailed yet static study of James and Skinner 
(1985). We first review the central role of natural resource abundance in American 
industrialization. Based on this premise, we show that a calibrated Solow model 
augmented by natural resources offers a straightforward explanation of all empirical 
regularities of “labor scarcity” listed above while accounting for the dynamic process of 
America overtaking Britain.
The Central Role of Natural Resources in American Industrialization
Although Temin’s (1966) original specification was not satisfactory, it nevertheless 
serves to show that the labor scarcity paradox (i.e., higher US real wage and higher US 
real interest rate) can’t be reconciled within a two-factor framework. A natural choice is 
the introduction of natural resources as the important third factor. Essentially, both
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tVicapital and labor were scarce in the US during the 19 century, and the abundant 
factor was natural resources.
America’s abundant natural resources and their central role in the American 
industrialization process have been very well documented and emphasized by leading 
economic historians and theorists, for example, Ames and Rosenberg (1968), 
Christensen (1981), Wright (1990) and Romer (1996), among others. Before we 
proceed, we shall note that the word “industrialization” may not be very precise, since it 
also happened in agriculture. Maybe “mechanization” would be more appropriate under 
certain circumstances.
America’s abundant resources included land, forest, raw materials, minerals and cheap 
energy, among others. For example, Christensen (1981) showed that while it only took 
2.9 labor-weeks to purchase one acre land in the US in 1850, it would take 60.6 labor- 
weeks in Britain. Christensen (1981) further notes, “The abundance of natural capital -  
the climate, the fertility of the soil, the availability of water and timber, and the terrain -  
directly and indirectly facilitated the formation of farm capital” (p. 312). As a result, the 
total cost of farm-making (including breaking sod, fencing, barns, equipment, livestock, 
seeds, and the first-year maintenance) in America around 1850 was only about half of 
that of Britain. Therefore, American farms were typically larger, which “favored the 
more extensive use of horses and machinery.” This created a large market for 
agricultural machines and equipment, such as “new cast-iron and steel plows, disks, 
harrows, cultivators, drills, planters, reapers and mowers” (p. 317).
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Turning to the manufacturing sector, Christensen (1981) observed that America’s 
“availability of low-cost energy presented a strong incentive for the adoption of power­
intensive machine technologies” (p. 323). For example, in America water power was 
only “half as expensive as British (or American steam)” (p. 322) and “in the early 
decades of the 19th century, industrial power in America came almost entirely from 
water. By 1840, water still supplied nearly 90% of industrial power requirements” (p.
t h323). The resource-intensive nature of American technology in the 19 century was 
vividly demonstrated in different designs of steam engines in America versus Britain. 
While Britain relied mostly on low-pressure Boulton and Watt engines with “higher 
initial cost, greater complexity of operation, and better fuel consumption” (p. 324), the 
American steam technology was based almost exclusively on high-pressure engines, 
which were considerably lower in initial cost, easier to maintain and repair, but higher 
in fuel consumption.
The abundance of American “water” not only helped generate power, it also provided a 
much cheaper form of transportation through a vast system of natural internal 
waterways. Largely because of this:
America led the world in the development and exploitation of the steamboat by 
the second quarter of the nineteenth century... .Even the twelve-fold increase in 
tonnage between 1820 and 1860 drastically understates the growth in transport 
services provided by steamboat because of major increases in speed and in cargo 
capacity in relation to measured tonnage. (Rosenberg, 1972, p. 69)
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In the same spirit, Ames and Rosenberg (1968) observed that “the woodworking 
machines which were popular in America and neglected in England were not only 
labor-saving but also wasteful of wood” (p. 831). The abundance of wood may have 
prompted the early invention and adoption of the lathe in the American gun-making 
industry, which greatly improved efficiency. As pointed out by Ames and Rosenberg 
(1968), “With Birmingham methods it required 75 men to produce 100 [gun] stocks per 
day. Using the early (1818) version of the Blanchard lathe, 17 men could produce 100 
stocks per day” (p. 832).
In the area of metallurgy, America’s resource abundance was also critical. After the 
“hot blast” technique was developed in England in 1828, it was quickly introduced to 
America in 1834 because “it permitted the exploitation of a resource [anthracite coal] 
which was highly abundant and readily accessible to America’s main population 
centers” (Rosenberg, 1972, p. 81). In the 1890s, the “open hearth process” grew rapidly 
in America:
Although it produced a superior steel as compared to the Bessemer process, the 
overwhelming advantage of the basic open hearth process was its ability to 
utilize a wide spectrum of the abundant phosphoric ores of the United States 
which could not be utilized by the Bessemer process. (Rosenberg, 1972, pp. 81- 
83)
In summary, abundance of natural resources played a central role in the American 
mechanization and industrialization process. A salient characteristic of American
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technology in the nineteenth century was its resource intensiveness and energy 
intensiveness. As characterized by Rosenberg (1977):
Much of what distinguished the American experience was attributable to the fact 
that, when she commenced her industrialization in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, she did so with the pool of British experience upon which to draw, but 
also from a distinctively more favorable resource position, (p. 21)
Next, we turn to a parsimonious Solow growth model augmented by natural resources 
to account for this unique American industrialization process.
The Solow Model Augmented by Natural Resources
Motivated by the importance of natural resources in American industrialization and the 
need to account for the “labor scarcity paradox,” we follow Solow (1999) to set up a 
three-factor Cobb-Douglas (1928) production function in capital, labor and natural 
resources for both the US and the UK. We assume that both countries share the same 
production parameter values of a  and /?. Because there was minimal restriction on 
technology transfer between America and Britain during most part of the nineteenth 
century (Habakkuk, 1962, pp. 96-97), it seems reasonable to assume the same 
production parameters, although the rates of technical change are allowed to differ due 
to the lag in technological diffusion across the Atlantic Ocean. This serves as a
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benchmark case, for which we later examine how well our model matches the data. It 
is assumed that the production function is:
Y = K a(A L y R l-a-p . (2.1)
Country subscripts are suppressed at this point. A critical assumption is the presence of 
natural resources, R, which are assumed to be renewable and inexhaustible, i.e., a fixed 
constant. We further assume that natural resources are immobile between the US and 
the UK. This is plausible for the nineteenth century when the cost of transportation was 
high and the scale of international trade in natural resources was small.
As in the standard Solow model, the technology level A and the labor force L grow at 
constant rates of g and n respectively, and the capital stock K  depreciates at the constant 
rate of S . The saving rate is fixed at s. a, (3 and 1 -  a  -  (3 are all between 0 and 1 and 
represent the income shares of capital, labor and natural resources respectively. To my 
knowledge, this formulation of natural resources in a neoclassical growth has not been 
taken very seriously yet in the literature. So this paper amounts to one of the first 
attempts to make it fully “operational” and test its validity through a particular 
application.
The dynamics of capital stock K  are given by the following differential equation:
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K = sY  -  5K = sKa(AL)P R x~a~p -  SK . (2.2)
In the standard Solow model, the trick to simplify the solution is to normalize the 
capital stock K  by the efficient labor AL. Under the present setting, it turns out that the
proper scaling is given by {AL)x~a , which reduces to the usual efficiency unit of AL 
when «  + /? = !. Effective capital and effective output are defined respectively by:
k =— — r  , (2.3)
{AL) 1 -a
y =  —  V  ■ <2 -4>
(AL)[-a
Dividing both sides of the original production function by the efficiency unit (AL)l~a , 
we can rewrite it in the intensive form:
y = k aRl-a-p . (2.5)
By definition, K = k{AL)\-a . Differentiate it logarithmically with respect to time to get:
*L~!l P {A -
K  ~ k + \ - a {  A + L
= ^- + -P — {n + g ). (2.6)
k  1 -  a
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On the other hand, divide both sides of equation (2.2) by K, yielding:
— = sK^H A l Y r 1- ^  -  8  = ska-lR l~a -  8 .  
K  v '
(2.7)
Equating equations (2.6) and (2.7) yields:
k = skaRl a P — @ (n + g) + 8 k .
1 -o r
(2 .8)
This is the fundamental equation governing the dynamics of the effective capital stock. 
Because the production function is Cobb-Douglas (1928), the normal assumptions of 
positive and diminishing returns and Inada conditions are automatically satisfied. This 
assures that no matter where the economy was initially (except the trivial and 
impossible case of k0 = 0), it converges monotonically to a unique steady-state level of
k *, satisfying k -  0 :
Obviously, a higher level of natural resources R would raise the steady-state value of 
k *. If we just blindly assume that all parameter values between US and Britain were the 
same except natural resources R, then ultimately the US economy would converge to a 
higher level of k* than Britain. In reality, both the saving rate and labor force growth
/ 1 - a
(2.9)
v 1 - a
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rate were higher in the US. As will be shown later, the end result was a much higher 
steady-state value of US capital stock per efficiency unit. Of course, the initial US level 
of capital k was much lower than Britain’s, as it would be costly for new immigrants to 
bring too much capital stock with them to the New World. Most capital stock would 
have to be built up indigenously. One of the stylized facts emphasized by James and 
Skinner (1985) was that, overall, the US was still less capital intensive than the UK 
around 1850. According to Maddison (1982, Table 3.5, p. 54), the US capital stock per 
worker was about 83.5% that of the US in 1870.
Assuming that factors are paid their marginal products, then the real interest rate and the 
real wage are given by:
r + S = —  = aka-'Rl-a-/} , 
dK
(2.10)
w -  = BAka
dL
{  ^ 1- a - t
R
i
\  { A L ) \ - a  j
(2.11)
From (2.10), it is clear that before converging to the steady state, America’s real interest 
rate would be higher than Britain’s for two reasons. A usual reason was America’s 
lower effective capital stock. Another reason was America’s abundant natural resources, 
which raised capital’s marginal efficiency. From (2.11), we see that despite the lower 
initial US capital stock, the real wage in the US was boosted by abundant natural 
resources, and it was possible for the US to have both a higher real wage and a higher 
real interest rate than Britain.
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Production Parameters
Due to the paucity of historical data, I cannot estimate production function parameters a 
and ft by standard econometric methods.11 So we have to calibrate these parameters 
from income shares. Britain’s labor income share had been quite stable. It was 0.63 in 
1843, 0.625 in 1913, and again 0.625 in 1938. On the other hand, labor’s income share 
in America had been declining from 0.80 in 1850 to 0.74 in 1910 then to 0.665 in 1938 
(see Table 4). Habakkuk (1962) argued that “the fall is almost certainly to be explained 
by the decline in the number of self-employed persons as the result of the relative 
increase of industry...” (p. 36). If this were true, then the primary reason for America’s 
high labor income share in 1850 was that it included returns from natural resources
1 7(such as land) owned mostly by self-employed individuals.
111 tried running regressions using data from Maddison (1982) for Great Britain, but the parameter 
estimates don’t make much sense with a  =  0.66 andp =  1.2. One reason is that the sample size is too 
small (every ten years from 1820 to 1913).
12 In 1870, 50% of the total employment was in the agricultural sector in America while the British 
counterpart was only 22.7%. This gap would have been larger in 1850. Source: Maddison (1982), Table 
C5, p. 205.
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Table 4
Labor’s Income Shares in the US and the UK
Country/Y ear 1843 1850 1910 1913 1938
US - 0.80 0.74 - 0.665
UK 0.63 - “ 0.625 0.625
Data source: Habakkuk (1962), p. 111.
If this were the case, then the difference of labor’s income shares between America and 
Britain may proxy the income share for natural resources around 1850, i.e., 1 -  a  -  /? = 
0.80 -  0.63 = 0.17. The remaining 0.2 (i.e., 1 -  0.8) is capital’s income share. Therefore, 
as a baseline case, we assume the production parameters to be uniform across the US 
and Britain, with capital share a = 0.2, labor share /? = 0.63, and resource share 1 - a -  
= 0.17.
Capital Stock. Labor Force. Population and Output
James and Skinner’s (1985, p. 527) estimates of total capital stocks for the US and 
Britain in 1849 and 1851 respectively were somewhat problematic since they used 
current par exchange rates. To use PPP exchange rates, I start with Maddison’s (1982,
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Table 3.5, p. 54) estimates of the US and British capital stock per worker in 1870, 
which were $5,066 and $6,068 respectively.
The US and British labor forces are estimated to be 12.24 million and 13.95 million in 
1870 respectively, and the labor force growth rates were 2.72% for the US during 1869- 
1909 and 0.89% for the UK during 1861-1911 (Broadberry and Irwin, 2006).
Therefore, the estimated US and Britain total capital stocks in 1870 were $62,002.14 
million and $84,654.15 million respectively.
The US and British population were estimated to be 40.241 million and 45.649 million 
in 1870 respectively (Maddison, 2001), which implies a lower labor force participation 
rate in the US (30.4%) than in the UK (44.4%).13 But the US population grew at a faster 
rate of 2.08% compared with the UK’s population growth rate of 0.87% during 1870- 
1913.
Per capita output data were also taken from Maddison (2001), which were $2,445 and 
$3,191 in 1870 for the US and the UK respectively in 1990 international dollars. The 
growth rates of per capita output during 1870-1913 were 3.94% and 1.90% for the US 
and the UK respectively.
13 The explanation of why the US labor participation rate was much lower than the UK’s is beyond the 
scope o f this paper. It is taken as a given fact.
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With the above estimates of a,/3 , capital stock, labor and output, it is straightforward 
to compute the stock of natural resources for the US and the UK using the production 
function (2.1) after normalizing the technology levels in 1870 to unity. As a 
benchmark case, we assume that the technology levels in the US and the UK were the 
same in the year 1870. This approximation may be reasonable since there was minimal 
restriction on technology transfer between America and Britain during most of the 
nineteenth century (Habakkuk, 1962, pp. 96-97), and the US inventive activities didn’t 
speed up until the end of the nineteenth century. These assumptions imply that 
Rus =5.02xl025 and RUK = 2.38xlO25.
Note that the absolute values of the natural resource stock do not mean too much, since 
I normalize the technology level in 1870 to unity. But it does imply that the US stock of
natural resources is about 2.11 times that of UK, so that —— = 2.11.
Ruk
The Implied Values of Interest Rates and Wage Rates 
With this estimate of the resource ratio of the US to the UK, we can determine the
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implied ratios of real interest rates and real wage rates between the US and the UK 
from equations (2.10) and (2.11). Thus, = 1.43 and —— = 1.12.
r UK W UK
The actual average real interest rates for the US and Britain during 1865-1874 were 
4.47% and 3.26% respectively,14 implying an interest rate ratio of 1.37, which is not far 
from the above figure of 1.43.
The implied ratio of real wages appears to be too low, with various estimates in the 
literature ranging from 1.25-1.52 (James and Skinner, 1985, pp. 537), but it is still 
broadly consistent. Due to the difficulty of measuring real wages, it could be that those 
historical estimates were overestimated.
In short, this model reconciles very well with the “labor scarcity paradox,” i.e., the 
coexistent higher US real interest rate and real wage compared with the UK.
The Rate of Technical Change
We use a growth accounting procedure to estimate the average rate of technical change 
for the US and the UK. The average growth rates of the US and the UK capital stocks
14 Data are from the same source as Figure 7.
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are estimated at 4.7% and 1.62% respectively during 1870-1913 (Maddison, 1982, 
Tables D12 and D13, pp. 231-232). Production function (2.1) implies that the rate of 
technical change is given by,
A _ _ l 
A ~  f t
r Y k—  a  B —
v7 K
(2 .12)
This formula implies the following average rates of technical change during 1870-1913: 
gus = 1.935% and gUK = 1.772%.
Saving Rates and Depreciation Rates
The US average saving rate was considerably higher than the UK’s. According to 
Maddison (1982, Table 2.3, p. 40), the US saving rate was 13.8% during 1871-1910, 
compared with 6.875% for the UK during the same period.
We further assume that the depreciation rate was 5% for both countries, following the 
standard practice in macroeconomic calibration (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, 
Chapter 1). The result of the simulation in the next section is robust to different values 
of depreciation rates, e.g., 3% or 4%.
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Numerical Simulation for the US and UK  Economies During 1870 -  1913
KThe effective capital stocks for the US and the UK can be calculated as k = —j -  after
lF a
normalizing the technology level in 1870 to unity for both countries. Therefore, in 1870 
the US and British effective capital stocks were kus 1870 = 162,483.87 and kUK lg70 = 
200,112.23.
Again these absolute magnitudes do not mean very much since the technology level A 
was arbitrarily set to unity in 1870. However, it does show that in 1870, the US 
effective capital stock was about 81.2% that of the UK.
Was the American steady state level of the effective capital stock higher than the 
British? America’s higher level of natural resources and higher saving rate both had 
positive effects. However, these effects were partly offset by America’s higher 
population growth rate. From equation (2.9), the steady-state effective capital stock for 
the US and the UK were k'us = 517,965.36 and k'UK = 237,379.68.
Therefore, the US steady-state value of effective capital stock was about 2.18 times 
higher than the UK’s.
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With the above initial values of effective capital stocks in 1870, it is straightforward 
to solve the fundamental differential equation (2.8) numerically during 1870-1913. The 
simulation results are given in Figure 8.
Sim ulation of U S and  UK C apital S to c k  P e r  E fficiency Unit during 1870-1913
US C apital S to c k  P e r  Efficiency Unit
4 .5
UK C apital S to c k  P e r  Efficiency Unit
3 .5
o  2 .5
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Y ear
Figure 8. Simulation of the US and UK capital stocks per efficiency unit.
From the above simulations, it is clear that both the US and the UK capital stocks 
converged to their respective steady-state values. At first sight, it looks surprising that 
the “overtaking” happened around year 1873, which was before most economists’ 
estimate the overtaking occurred, which most economists believe was around 1890. 
However, this was capital stock per efficiency unit. It is not capital stock per worker or 
GDP per capita.
Next, we look at the simulation of GDP per capita for the US and the UK during 1870- 
1913, which does correspond to the actual “overtaking” year pretty well (Figure 9).
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Sim ulation of U S and  UK G D P P e r  C apita during 1870-1913
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Figure 9. Simulation of the US and UK GDP per capita during 1870-1913.
The above simulations indicate that the US GDP per capita overtook the UK around 
1895, which matches very well with the historical fact in Figure 5 at the beginning of 
this paper. However, the predicted values of GDP per capita in 1913 ($5,979.16 and 
$5,541.33 for the US and the UK respectively) were a bit higher than the historical 
statistics ($5,301 and $4,921 respectively) in Maddison (2001). The US and the UK 
GDP per capita were overpredicted 12.8% and 12.6% respectively over the span of 43 
years from 1870-1913 (i.e., they were only overpredicted by about 0.3% per year). 
Overall, the fit of the model is pretty good, and it mimics the actual process of America 
catching up with Britain toward the end of the nineteenth century.
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The neoclassical growth model is one of the most robust models in economics and has 
become a workhorse in macroeconomics for decades. This paper again demonstrates its 
power in organizing our understanding of the comparative US-UK economic 
performance in the nineteenth century. The apparently complex interactions among the 
three productive factors of capital, labor and natural resources in America, known as the 
“labor scarcity paradox,” become transparent through a Solow model augmented by 
natural resources. Calibration results match all empirical regularities of the American 
and British economies around 1850. Numerical simulations mimic the dynamic 
catching up process pretty well. It is hard to imagine how we could gain this clarity of 
understanding without a growth framework.
Of course, this model would not hold in the twentieth century with increasing 
international trade and factor mobility. The assumption of resource immobility lost its 
validity. Countries with little resources such as Japan have achieved great economic 
growth. However, overall this Solow model augmented by natural resources does a 
pretty good job in describing the comparative growth experience of the US and the UK 
in the nineteenth century, and it is a success of the neoclassical growth model.
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CHAPTER III
THE NEEDHAM PUZZLE RECONSIDERED: 
THE ROLE OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Introduction
In the late 1930s, Joseph Needham raised his now famous puzzle: Why, with all of its 
great technological achievements (Needham 1954, Temple 1986), didn’t the Industrial 
Revolution and the inception of modem science take place in China? According to 
Needham (1954), Chinese “technological discoveries and inventions were often far in 
advance of contemporary Europe, especially up to the 15th century” (p. 6). Francis 
Bacon (2000) famously claimed that the three major Chinese inventions - paper, 
compass and gunpowder - had reshaped the world. This contrasts sharply with China’s 
stagnation in modern times for centuries. China’s ancient technological prowess was 
also reflected in economic historians’ estimates of per capita income. According to
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Maddison (2001), in year 1,000 China’s per capita GDP was among the highest in the 
world, i.e., $450 compared with $400 for Western Europe (both in 1990 international 
dollars) (p. 264, Table B-21; see Figure 10).
As reflected by Mokyr (1990), “The greatest enigma in the history of technology is the 
failure of China to sustain its technological supremacy” (p. 209). Obviously, a better 
understanding of the Needham puzzle has far-reaching implications for not only China, 
but also the entire developing world, especially where the Industrial Revolution is yet to 
folly unfold.
Log of G D P per C apita  in 1990 International $
9 .5
China
W e ste rn  Europe
^  7 .5
6 .5
5 .5
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Figure 10. Log of GDP per capita for China and Western Europe during A.D. 
0-1998 (in 1990 International $). Source: Maddison (2001), p. 264, Table B-21.
Many scholars have attempted to answer this intriguing question. A host of factors have 
been proposed, ranging from cultural, philosophical, religious, psychological, and 
economic factors as candidates. It may have even become a pasttime for China scholars.
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For example, Wang (2002) compiled an 886-page selection of essays in Chinese 
aiming at resolving this puzzle from almost all possible aspects. But noneconomic 
explanations usually cannot stand under close scrutiny (Mokyr 1990), since 
noneconomic variables are usually slow changing and can’t be easily reconciled with 
China’s dramatic change in fortune. This paper focuses on economic explanations. 
Existing economic answers can be roughly classified into two categories: demand 
failure theories (Elvin, 1973; Tang, 1979; Chao, 1986) or supply failure theories 
(Baumol 1990; Murphy et al., 1991, 1993; Lin, 1995).
The demand failure hypothesis -  also called “the high level equilibrium trap” - 
maintains that China’s unfavorable man-to-land ratio diminished (if not eliminated) her 
demand for new technology, since labor was so abundant and cheap in China. A high 
man-to-land ratio also meant that there wasn’t enough surplus or saving for research. 
This line of approach was proven to be empirically unimportant by Lin (1995). Using 
historical data, Lin found little empirical correlation between China’s man-to-land ratio 
(population divided by cultivated land) and the speed of technological progress.
Interestingly, Pomeranz (2000) seemed to revive this “resource endowment” hypothesis 
and maintained that Europe and China (especially the respective advanced areas, 
namely England and the Yangtze delta) were basically comparable before 1800 in 
population history, agriculture, handicraft industry, income and consumption. “The 
Great Divergence” happened only after 1800 largely because of the lucky availability of 
coal in England and other raw materials from the New World. However, neoclassical
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growth theory since Solow (1956) made it clear that capital formation alone is not 
enough to sustain long-run growth without continuous technical change.
Lin (1995) offered a supply-side explanation instead; i.e., the Industrial Revolution 
depended critically on the Scientific Revolution, which for many reasons did not 
happen in China. Another supply failure theory (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991, 
1993) proposed that China’s civil service exams created too much rent-seeking 
opportunities, which drained Chinese geniuses from productive innovation into 
unproductive or even destructive rent-seeking activities.
A central finding of this paper is that supply-side hypotheses are not important in 
practice either. Even with enough potential demand and supply for new technology in 
premodem China, technological progress could still stagnate due to market failure and 
the lack of formal institutions defining the ownership of intellectual properties, such as 
patent protection. Since the influential work of North and Thomas (1973) and North 
(1981, 1990), institutions are increasingly viewed by many as the key to long-run 
economic performance. In an important empirical study, Acemoglu et al. (2001) used 
colonial settlement mortality variable as an instrument and found large effects of 
institutions on income per capita. Therefore, it is surprising that few scholars have 
linked China’s institutional weakness to the resolution of the Needham puzzle. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap by focusing on a particular institution - patent protection - 
as a prominent example.
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Of course, Industrial Revolution was a very complex phenomenon with many 
interrelated facets. In a broad sense, this paper is in agreement with Eric Jones’s (2003) 
position that the strength of Europe lay in many factors going back for centuries. The 
exact dating of when Europe overtook China is not specifically relevant -  Maddison 
(1998) put it in the fourteenth century while Pomeranz (2000) put it as late as 1800 - 
but the truly amazing thing about Europe was its ability to build a solid institutional 
foundation (culminating in patent laws, etc.) to support sustainable growth and 
innovation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the Scientific 
Revolution hypothesis and presents theoretical and empirical evidence against it.
Section 3 examines and dismisses the rent-seeking argument. Section 4 highlights the 
differences between ancient and modem modes of invention. Section 5 provides an 
inventor’s choice model, through which the importance of patent protection is deduced. 
Section 6 presents cross-country statistical evidence of the impact of patent laws on 
invention rates. Section 7 asks whether James Watt could have been a Chinese and 
examines his life as a case study. Section 8 reflects on China’s lack of legal tradition. 
Section 9 concludes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
How Important Was the Scientific Revolution?
Lin (1995) maintained that China was lucky in the premodem world because her sheer 
population size increased the chance of experience-based invention through trial-and- 
error (i.e., more people means more chances of trial-and-error leading to inventions) 
and became lackluster when invention became increasingly based on experiment-cum- 
science since the Industrial Revolution. From year 0 to 1600, China’s population was 
roughly twice as big as all of Europe (including Western and Eastern Europe). See 
Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Populations of China and Western Europe during A.D. 0- 
1998 (in millions). Data source: Maddison (2001), p.241, Table B-10.
Kremer (1993) documented that the differential long-term economic performance of 
five regions on earth (Eurasia/Africa, the Americas, Australia, Tasmania, and the
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Flinders Island) isolated from each other since the end of the last ice age around 
10,000 B.C. closely matched up with their initial population ranks. Basically, more 
people mean more ideas can be created.
However, the second half of Lin’s hypothesis is problematic. It is far from consensus 
that the Industrial Revolution depended historically on the development of science. 
According to Musson (1972), “At the beginning, the contribution of science to 
technology was sporadic; in fact whether or not science was a major contributing factor 
to the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century is still subject to debate” (p. 58). 
Polanyi (1962) put it bluntly, “Up to 1846 natural science had made no major 
contribution to technology. The Industrial Revolution has been achieved without 
scientific aid” (p. 182). Although science has played a significant role in technological 
progress since the mid-nineteenth century (Cameron, 1989), that was about a century 
later. As mused by Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), “The West surpassed other societies 
in.. .science -  by the time of Galileo, say, 1600... .But the wealth of Western economics 
did not clearly draw ahead of the wealth of their predecessors and other economies for 
another hundred and fifty or two hundred years” (p. 254). Any attempt to give the 
Scientific Revolution a direct role in the Industrial Revolution would have to somehow 
explain away this awkward gap of one or two hundred years between the two.
In his study of British patent data during 1711-1850, Sullivan (1990) tested the role of 
science on invention. His idea was that if science was important during the Industrial 
Revolution, then the most relevant direct link:
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would have been from advances in chemical and mechanical science to 
chemical and mechanical invention. If this were significant, we should observe 
increasing shares of patenting for heavy chemical and machine inventions, but 
the patent data show only decreasing or constant shares, (p. 359)
Therefore, Sullivan (1990) concluded that “the patent data do not, however, reveal a 
pattern that suggests a large influence of scientific advance on invention” (p. 359).
A direct test of the Scientific Revolution hypothesis, however, is to examine how much 
stock of scientific knowledge those major British inventors during the Industrial 
Revolution had acquired. If most of them did not have significant scientific training, 
this would weaken the Scientific Revolution hypothesis. Twelve major British 
inventors are identified in the article “Industrial Revolution” in Encyclopedia 
Americana (2002) by Hugh G. Cleland. (American inventor Eli Whitney was also 
mentioned, but omitted.) Among them, six were in the textile industry, three in the 
steam engine industry, two in the iron industry and two in the steam transportation 
industry (see Table 5). Out of these 12 major British inventors, only two of them
received college educations (a ratio of —), and one of them majored in religion.
6
Although college education was still rare in Britain around that time, this does cast 
doubt on the importance of science on the Industrial Revolution. This finding is 
consistent with Rosenberg and Birdzell’s (1986) assertion that “until about 1875, or 
even later, the technology used in the economies of the West was mostly traceable to 
individuals who were not scientists, and who often had little scientific training” (p.
244). The bottom line is that if the Scientific Revolution were crucial for the Industrial
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Revolution, then we should be able to name specific scientific knowledge that was 
responsible or indispensable for major inventions during the Industrial Revolution. But 
to my best knowledge, no one has been able to name it.
Table 5
Education of British Inventors during the Industrial Revolution




Richard Arkwright 1732-1792 Textile No Yes
Edmund Cartwright 1743-1823 Textile Yes
(in religion)
Yes
Samuel Crompton 1753-1827 Textile No No
James Hargreaves 17027-1778 Textile No Yes
Lewis Paul 7-1759 Textile Little is 
known
Yes
Thomas Newcomen 1663 - 1729 Steam Engine No15 Yes
Thomas Savery 1650- 1715 Steam Engine Yes Yes
James Watt 1736- 1819 Steam Engine No Yes
Henry Cort 1740- 1800 Iron No Yes
John Wilkinson 1728 - 1808 Iron No Yeslb
John McAdam 1756- 1836 Steam Transportation No? No?
George Stephen 1781 - 1848 Steam Transportation No ?
Sources: Encyclopedia Americana (2002) and Encyclopedia Britannica (1995).
15 http://es.rice.edu/ES/humsoc/Galileo/Catalog/Files/newcomen.html
16 http://www.wrexham.gov.uk/english/leisure_tourism/ cultureheritage/JohnWilkinson.htm
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Perhaps the strongest case for the importance of Scientific Revolution was made by 
Mokyr (2002). While admitting that “it would be a grave error to suppose that the 
Industrial Revolution in its early stages was driven by a sudden deepening of the 
scientific foundations of technology” (p. 32).
Mokyr (2002) maintained that the development of science was crucial in preventing the 
Industrial Revolution from fizzling out like previous technological spurts had done in 
history. In his view, the key point of the Industrial Revolution wasn’t that it happened, 
but rather that it was continued by the Second and Third Industrial Revolutions.
However, there are several difficulties associated with this view. First, although it helps 
explain “why Europe,” it has nothing to say about “why Britain, not France,” because it 
is not tenable to argue that Britain was more advanced in scientific development than 
France. Second, the reverse of Mokyr’s thesis is also true, if not more so; i.e., the 
Scientific Revolution was able to continue without petering out like previous spurts 
(e.g., the great scientific achievements of the Greek and Islamic civilizations) because 
of the sustained Industrial Revolution (running on its own for at least one hundred 
years), which created the demand, motivation, and means to deepen scientific 
investigation into an industry from a hobby of the privileged few driven by curiosity 
(Fox and Guagnini, 1999).
Even if we accept Mokyr’s thesis wholesale, then there would be nothing to prevent 
China from generating the First Industrial Revolution and sustaining it for one to two
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hundred years, and the great divergence between Europe and China wouldn’t begin 
until Europe embarked on the Second Industrial Revolution thanks to the deepening of 
science. But a China transformed by the First Industrial Revolution would have all the 
motivation to borrow from this reservoir of European knowledge in no time -  in this 
case, there wouldn’t be any “great divergence” after all.
In summary, it is a huge oversimplification to blame science for China’s lack of 
Industrial Revolution, and it misses the main point.
Was Rent Seeking Important?
Although Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) were not written to explain the 
Needham puzzle per se, they cited China as an example to support their rent-seeking 
theory. According to this theory, the Chinese civil exam system drained Chinese talents 
into ethics and poetry and away from inventive activities.
A critical assumption in this theory is that capable people are capable in all areas. 
According to this theory, when rent-seeking opportunities abound, a country’s most 
talented leave productive arenas (such as invention or entrepreneurship) to engage in 
unproductive or destructive rent seeking (such as poet-officials in China, tax collectors
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or religious clerics in Western Europe). Therefore, only people of secondary caliber 
are left in the productive arena. This slows down the technological progress since 
secondary people can only make secondary innovations.
However, people who are good at literature and socializing are not necessarily good at 
mechanics and engineering. If the chances of inheriting good engineering genes and 
good literature genes are both 10% and independent (or the correlation is sufficiently 
weak), then the probability of inheriting both genes is merely 1%. This explains why in 
reality truly Da Vinci-style versatile people are few and far between, and geniuses are 
often skewed and biased.
In any society, there will be a highest paying profession, be it officials, army officers or 
entrepreneurs. This doesn’t necessarily harm inventive activities. The key issue is 
whether the reward from invention is enough to cover expenses and make a decent 
living. CEOs in America have generous paychecks. But it doesn’t prevent American 
inventors from doing path-breaking research. Murphy et al. (1991) pointed out:
In eighteenth century France, the best and the brightest also became rent seekers. 
The great chemist Lavoisier’s main occupation was tax collecting, and 
Talleyrand was a bishop with a large tax income despite his prodigious 
entrepreneurial skills shown when he escaped to the United States after the 
French Revolution, (p. 505)
However, there were also tax collectors and bishops in contemporary Britain, and it is 
hard to determine whether France had more of them than Britain. One of the major
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British inventors mentioned before, Edmund Cartwright, was the rector of a church as 
well. What distinguished France from Britain historically seems to be the absence of 
positive incentives rather than the presence of negative incentives.
In the case of ancient China, although the reward for becoming an official through the 
civil service exams was very high in the forms of official pay, rent-seeking 
opportunities (Huang, 1997) and social prestige, the likelihood of winning these exams 
was very low due to its tournament nature and China’s huge population. The majority 
failed, and their failure became a recurring theme in Chinese literature. Because of 
fierce competition, it usually took more than 10 years of diligent study to prepare for the 
exams (often dubbed as “ten years of facing cold windows” in China). It is well known 
that an occupation that requires a longer period of training will have to be compensated 
more in order to equate the returns between different occupations (Mincer, 1958). 
Despite the remote chance of success and lengthy wait time, most Chinese intellectuals 
historically chose to pursue civil exams simply because there weren’t any decent 
alternatives. The reward from inventions was very low because there was no patent 
protection to guarantee that they could recover the expenses and reap the benefits. 
Understandably, when the Chinese civil exam system was finally abolished in 1912, 
things did not improve immediately.
Premodem inventors were mostly not intellectuals. They were more likely artisans, 
smiths, or farmers who were familiar with the production processes. Historically, it is 
difficult to subscribe to the view that China has ever had a shortage of skillful and
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ingenious smiths and artisans among her large population. In premodem times, the 
demand for handicraft and repair work was more likely to be quite stable in an agrarian 
economy. Whether they did come forward to engage in inventive activities was a 
different consideration, to be explored in the next section.
Empirically, the rent-seeking hypothesis is also anachronistic. The civil exam system 
was instituted in China as early as the Sui dynasty (589-617), and China continued to 
make important inventions and lead the world technologically until before the Industrial 
Revolution (1760-1840). If the civil exam system had drained China’s technological 
creativity, Chinese civilization should have flounder as early as the 6th century, when 
China was actually poising to enter a long and prosperous age.
The Modes of Invention: Then and Now
Lin (1995) proposed an apparently ingenious way to reconcile the Needham puzzle. 
According to this view, ancient inventions were based on “experience,” which depends 
largely on the population size. A larger population means that there are more “trials and 
errors” and a higher chance of invention. On the other hand, modem inventions since 
the Industrial Revolution are based on “experiment-cum-science,” which failed to 
happen in China.
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However, the difference between “experience” and “experiment” is somewhat vague. 
Ancient inventors could and did do experiments. A better distinction is that ancient 
inventions were mostly the results of costless learning by doing while modern 
inventions are characterized by deliberate and costly R & D. Why did China invent the 
compass and gunpowder but couldn’t use them more productively as compared with 
Europe? The initial discoveries might happen through happy serendipity during trial and 
error, but continuing improvement and perfection certainly required substantial R & D 
investment, which were not supported by Chinese institutions.
Following Lin (1995), we can think of the process of technological invention as a 
random draw through trial and error from a distribution of productivity. Technological 
progress occurs when a draw yields higher productivity than the current level. More 
people mean more draws and hence more technological progress. However, if this 
productivity distribution is fixed, then finding a higher level of productivity becomes 
increasingly difficult. According to Lin (1995), the Scientific Revolution shifted this 
distribution rightward, resulting in a spurt of new inventions. But we have shown in the 
previous section that the Scientific Revolution was unlikely to be historically 
responsible for such a shift. Instead, the increase in R & D spending was crucial. When 
a researcher is doing “trial and error,” there are infinitely many different ways to do it 
with entirely different cost and benefit profiles. The method of experiment not only 
means that it can be repeated many times but more importantly in many different ways 
than the existing production process. After thousands of years exploring at the low end 
of R&D expenses, the potential of learning by doing gradually diminished and dried up.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
The possibility of making epochal invention became very remote. On the other hand, 
the high end of R&D expenses is a still fertile land. It was a systematic and dramatic 
increase in R&D expenses that pushed the research frontier significantly outward.
A Simple Model of Inventor’s Choice
In order to analyze what caused this systematic and dramatic increase in R & D 
expenses, a simple model of inventor’s choice is used below. We do not claim much 
novelty of this model. It is static. But it provides a useful framework for exposition 
purposes. Assume that a potential inventor allocates his total fixed time (L ) between 
invention ( Z,) and regular artisan work (Z2) to maximize income (Y)\
j ] g x  Y = p[EQl(K,H,Ll)+EQ2( L - L , ' i - ( r  + S)K + J , L - L l) (3.1)
s.t. 0 < K  < K  (liquidity constraint)
0 < Lx < L (time constraint),
where EQX is the expected output of invention through R&D,  which is a function of R 
& D capital K, the inventor’s human capital H  (assumed exogenous here), and the time 
devoted to inventive activities Z,. EQ2 is the expected output of coincidental invention
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through learning by doing, which happens as a byproduct of his regular artisan work. 
Theoretically, the more time is devoted to regular artisan work, the more likely it is to 
experience learning by doing. Practically, the chance of a happy discovery is remote for 
an individual (although it may be significant at the aggregate level). It may take an 
artisan decades of repeating the same production process before landing on a truly 
inspiring idea. Therefore, we neglect this “learning by doing” term EQ2 in this 
maximization problem. In any case, before the Industrial Revolution, the potential of 
learning by doing without significant R & D was almost exhausted.
The unit price of invention, p, is a hypothetical market price if the invention (say, 
patent) is to be sold in a market with perfect information. Under an ideal situation, the 
value of a patent is determined by the discounted sum of expected future profits 
accruing from manufacturing commercial products using this patent; r is the interest 
rate of capital financed, d is the rate of depreciation, and w the wage of regular artisan 
or alternative work. The inventor takes all prices, his human capital stock H, and 
maximum available capital K  as given. Assuming interior solutions, the first-order
,. . dQ, r + S dQ, w . ,conditions are — -  ------  and — - = — respectively.
dK p dL, p
It is immediately clear that the lower the patent price is, the lower the optimal inventive 
capital and inventive labor are, and hence the lower the inventive output would be. 
Furthermore, if the patent price is zero, then all inventive inputs and output are zero. 
What determines a patent’s price? It depends on its potential profitability (e.g., the size
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of its applicable market), how easy it can be imitated, and the effective protection of 
intellectual properties. If a new invention is very profitable but can be easily imitated 
without significant technical or legal costs, then imitation products will soon flood the 
market. In a perfectly competitive market with free entry, this new industry bom out of 
the invention will quickly reach its industry-wide equilibrium, and each firm will earn 
zero profit. In this case, the price of an invention may be too small and potentially 
tending to zero. In this case, the original inventor will not be able to recoup his research 
expenses and will suffer losses. Of course, ex ante, he won’t even embark on this 
adventure to begin with. This is a classic case where the private rate of return falls short 
of the social rate of return (North and Thomas, 1973).
In his path-breaking paper, “Endogenous Technological Change,” Romer (1990) made 
this point crystal clear. The basic premise is that the inventor has to be a monopolist of 
his invention for at least a period of time in order to fully recover the R & D expenses 
and make a profit. Otherwise, the potential inventor would not engage in R&D in the 
first place. As pointed out by Romer, this same argument has been made many times 
before (Schumpeter, 1942; Arrow, 1962; Shell, 1966; Nordhaus, 1969; Wilson, 1975). 
To the extent that the large literature of new growth theory spawned by Romer (1990) is 
a useful guide in understanding long-mn growth, the importance of patent protection 
follows inexorably as a precondition.
Of course, there are inventions that cannot be easily imitated, and a monopolistic 
position can be simply maintained through secrecy. CocaCola’s secret recipe and
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Windows Operating System’s source code are two examples. However, many 
important inventions, especially those inventions during the Industrial Revolution of a 
mechanical nature, can be readily reverse engineered without much cost. After an 
ingenious inventor designed a new machine, other engineers could easily break it down 
to see how it works and make a clone. Therefore, in a society without patent protection, 
innovation may be strongly biased towards industries where secrecy may be enough 
protection, and inventions requiring patent protection may be delayed forever.
The price of a patent also depends crucially on the profitability of the firm using this 
patent. Firms’ profitability in turn depends upon business law for guaranteed smooth 
business transaction and protection of personal property rights.
In her innovative empirical study of 15,000 innovations at the Crystal Palace World’s 
Fair in 1851 and at the Centennial Exhibition in 1876, Moser (2005b) found that 
inventors in countries without patent laws (Denmark, Switzerland, and after 1869 the 
Netherlands) focused on a small set of industries where patents were less important 
(e.g., scientific instruments and food processing), whereas innovation in countries with 
patent laws appears to be much more diversified. The abolition of the Netherlands’ 
patent laws in 1869 due to largely ideological reasons gave Moser (2005a) a chance to 
isolate the effect of an exogenous shock of patent laws on innovation. After the 
Netherlands abandoned patent laws in 1869, the country’s innovation experienced a 
strong shift towards food processing, an industry where secrecy was important.
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Furthermore, technological diffusion may be as important as inventing new 
techniques. Patent laws promote technological diffusion by adding new knowledge to 
the public domain as soon as they become available, while secrecy prevails without 
patent protection. Moser (2005a) found that innovations in industries with high 
patenting rates were geographically dispersed, whereas innovations in industries with 
low patenting rates were geographically concentrated. Without patenting, innovation 
clustered not only within counties but also within cities.
Another function of patent protection is to facilitate the transmission of new technology. 
To receive patent protection, it is necessary to reveal the new “formula” to the public, 
which becomes freely available after the patent expires. Without a patent law, many 
new inventions were often kept as business secrets for a long time, if not forever. This 
may be particularly so in China’s history. Many high-quality products (including 
agricultural and handicraft products) were produced from a small local area or 
sometimes concentrated in just one city, indicating that state-of-the-art technology was 
difficult to diffuse throughout China.
In the long history of human civilization before the Industrial Revolution, invention 
happened at a very slow pace. Why did it suddenly accelerate and first in Britain? In 
fact, it was a quantum leap for a society without patent protection to jump into a society 
with patent protection. It is widely acknowledged that the first patent statute was 
enacted in Venice as early as 1474, and patents were granted even before that. But why 
didn’t the Industrial Revolution happen in Venice first? Remember that the price of an
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invention also depends on the size of its applicable market. Venice was only a city 
state with a small population (likely between 100,000 -  150,000 in the fifteenth 
century), and Venice was more a commercial than an industrial center (Nard and 
Morriss, 2004). Since this patent law was only applied to a small market, its impacts on 
technological progress were limited.
Britain became the first country to adopt a patent law in 1623. The seed for large 
sustained innovation was planted. In a little more than one hundred years, it bloomed 
into a full-fledged Industrial Revolution. According to Table 5, almost all key 
inventions by major British inventors during the Industrial Revolution were patented. 
Historically, America adopted a patent law in 1790, followed by France in 1791, which 
was almost one and a half centuries later than Britain. There has been a heated debate 
among scholars about whether Britain had an ex ante higher probability of the Industrial 
Revolution than France (for example, Crafts 1977, 1995). However, from the 
perspective of patent protection as a crucial incentive, Britain’s advantage was apparent 
and inevitable.
The Chinese patent system is one of the youngest in the world, unfortunately delayed by 
wars and failed reforms (Ganea et al., 2005). In 1898, a patent law was first enacted by 
the reform-oriented emperor Guangxu of the last Qing Dynasty. After Guangxu lost his 
own freedom, his reform was short-lived. The Nationalist government enacted a patent 
law for China in the turbulent year of 1944, which never entered into full force in 
mainland China (but was preserved in Taiwan). During 1950-1963, only four patents
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and six inventor certificates were granted in mainland China, and the system was 
abolished in 1963 altogether. The present patent law was finally enacted in 1984, 
although the preparations and training of patent staff started as early as 1979.
Certainly, with frequent media reports of rampant piracy in China, her patent system 
and enforcement are still widely considered inadequate. Nevertheless, Ganea et al. 
(2005) were amazed by “the high number of patent applications the Patent Office is 
capable of handling” (p. 3). La Croix and Konan (2002) concluded that although 
enforcement of intellectual property rights within China continues to be relatively weak, 
they are converging on those in the OECD nations. Furthermore, the role of patent 
protection in generating an indigenous Industrial Revolution versus assimilating 
advanced foreign technology can be quite different. A rigorous patent system may not 
always serve the best interest of a developing country, as it may negatively affect its 
borrowing of foreign technology (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005).
Besides the important issue of patent protection, it is worth pointing out that the 
availability of financial capital may also become a limiting factor, when optimal capital 
input is a comer solution and inventors have to rely on external financing. Therefore, a 
well-developed financial system and corporate governance are also cmcial for an 
Industrial Revolution. These institutions, developed rapidly before and during the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, were unfortunately mostly not in place in contemporary 
China.
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Cross-Country Evidence of Patent Laws’ Effect on Invention Rates
Economists generally agree that good institutions are important for long-run economic 
performance (e.g., North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001). However, there is far less 
agreement about exactly what institutions are good. Patent law is a salient example. The 
debate over patent law is old. This controversy reached such a height during 1850-1875 
that the Netherlands repealed its patent law in 1869, which was not reinstated until 1912 
(Malchup and Penrose, 1950).
Fundamentally, patent protection is a case of dynamic inconsistency. Before an 
invention is made, patent protection gives an incentive for innovation (few people 
dispute this). But once an invention is made, it is socially optimal to get rid of the 
inventor’s monopoly immediately. However, this may discourage future inventions.
The trade-off between static efficiency loss due to temporary monopoly and potential 
dynamic gain is well known in the optimal patent design literature, where the optimal 
patent life is found to be either finite (Nordhaus, 1969) or infinite (Judd, 1985; Gilbert 
and Shapiro, 1990). Yet, surprisingly, there has been very little hard evidence of 
whether there is “potential dynamic gain,” or if there is, how big it is. Recently Boldrin 
and Levine (2002) found evidence for dynamic net loss. In an excellent survey,
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MacLeod and Nuvolari (2006) conclude, “No consensus has been reached yet as to 
whether the emergence of the modem patent systems exerted a favorable impact on 
inventive activities” (p. 1).
An inherent difficulty in assessing the impact of patent laws on invention rates is that 
(paradoxically) the patent record is not an appropriate measure of invention rates for 
this purpose.17 By definition, the patent count is zero when a country doesn’t have a 
patent law. This certainly doesn’t prove anything. As a result, existing evidence in 
support of patent laws’ role in stimulating inventions is largely historical. By examining 
contemporary literature on inventions, Dutton (1984) observes that many inventors 
during the British industrial revolution were explicitly motivated by the prospect of 
profit from patents, and there was a group of “quasi professional inventors” who 
profitted through selling or licensing their intellectual properties. Similarly, Khan and 
Sokoloff (2004) (among other papers by Sokoloff and his co-authors) found that the 
American patent institution provided a key incentive to “great inventors” during 1790- 
1930 (identified by the Dictionary of American Biography). However, MacLeod (1988) 
cautions that some patentees took out patents for the sake of recognition (vanity 
patenting), and a large volume of inventive activities were undertaken outside the patent 
system.
Using data from 1851 and 1876 World Exhibitions, Moser (2005b) shows that patent 
laws had a significant impact on the direction of inventions in such a way that inventors
17 For limitations o f patent record as a measure o f invention rates under a general context, see Griliches 
(1990).
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in countries without patent protection focused on a small set of industries where 
secrecy is important while inventions in countries with patent protection were much 
more diversified. However, as pointed out by Moser (2005b), exhibition data have very 
little to say about patent laws’ impact on the overall invention rates, because of the 
subjective restrictions placed by the host country on participating countries’ exhibition 
spaces.
To get around the above issues of measuring invention rates consistently before and 
after the establishment of patent laws, two datasets of major invention counts are used 
in this study. The main dataset was from Clarence Streit’s book, Freedom Against Itself 
(1954), which contains 1,012 “major inventions, discoveries and innovations” during 
1750-1950 worldwide. As a robustness check, a smaller dataset from Funk & Wagnalls 
New Encyclopedia (2007) was also used, which includes 115 major inventions from 
1590-1900. Therefore, this study presents rare cross-country statistical evidence on the 
positive effect of patent laws on invention rates. A Poisson regression and a negative 
binomial regression are applied to these two datasets of major invention counts for the 
US and 14 Western European countries. The data point to a significant positive effect of 
patent laws on invention rates, after controlling for each country's economic size. The 
result is robust in different fixed effects and/or random effects specifications and after 
dropping the UK and the US from the sample.
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A Simple Theoretical Framework
As a simple theoretical framework, we assume that the number of major inventions that 
a country makes in a particular year follows a Poisson distribution. Furthermore, the 
Poisson arrival rate Xit depends on a country’s R&D input. Specifically, consider the
following knowledge/invention production function for country i in year t that is often 
used in the endogenous growth literature (e.g., Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995):
Theoretically, we expect 0 < S and 0 < /? < 1, since /? > 1 implies the counterfactual 
scale effect (i.e., larger R&D input leads to higher growth rate), which is strongly 
rejected by data (Jones 1995). Taking natural log and rearranging, we get:
patent law dummy LAWit, a country-specific/time-invariant constant term and an error 
term:
a, ,= s (r & d J  . (3.2)
R & D  i
logW,) = log <5+/Hog - + A log (GDP„).
\  (/ y
(3.3)
Now assume that a country’s research intensity depends linearly on its
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logf  R8l Dh'  
v GDP, j
■7ji +rjLAWit+ u it. (3.4)
Then we obtain the relationship:
log 1„ =a,+mog(GDP,)+fiAW„+e„. (3.5)
An alternative formulation is to split GDP into GDP per capita and population:
log'll, = a, + A log (POP, )+ A  log(GD/>C„)+ TLA W„ + e„, (3.6)
where GDPC is GDP per capita. Equation (3.6) reduces to equation (3.5) if = f32. 
However, log of GDP per capita and log of population are relatively highly correlated in 
our sample with a correlation coefficient of 0.40.18 This mild colinearity makes 
estimates less reliable. For example, the log of GDP per capita often turns up with a 
wrong negative sign. Although the effect of patent laws is robust under both 
specifications, we only report specification (3.5) in this study to save space.
18 This may be due to weak scale effect, i.e., output per worker depends positively on the population size 
in the long run. Or it may be due to a Malthusian effect, i.e., higher income leads to a higher fertility rate. 
Probably both effects are present.
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Streit’s List of Major Inventions During 1750-1950
The main dataset of major invention counts are taken from Clarence Streit’s book, 
Freedom Against Itself (1954k which includes a total of 1,012 major scientific 
discoveries, inventions and innovations during 1750-1950. Streit’s motivation for 
compiling such a long list was to show that free societies were more innovative than 
those that weren’t free. His book also includes a list of 70 experts and specialists in 
many fields all over the world that he consulted in creating this list. However, Streit’s 
list as it stands is too broad for our purpose, since it includes many scientific discoveries 
(e.g., chemical elements) and theories (e.g., quantum mechanics), political (e.g., 
suffrage), financial and social innovations (e.g., income tax, unemployment insurance), 
which were not relevant for our study of the role of patent laws. After removing 
irrelevant discoveries and social innovations, we end up with total of 614 major 
inventions (Appendix E).
Most inventions were made by the US and Western European countries, and most 
countries (including almost all developing countries) do not have any invention on 
Streit’s list. We chose 15 countries (the US and 14 Western European countries19) to be 
included in our sample to form a relatively homogeneous group in institutions, scientific
19 Our working definition o f Western Europe includes Sweden, Norway and Finland.
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development, and human capital endowment. If we include developing countries in 
the sample, the homogeneity of the sample would be compromised. (See more 
discussion about endogeneity and omitted variables below.) Furthermore, adding 
developing countries would only strengthen our case of patent laws’ positive impact on 
invention rates, since most developing countries established patent laws very late and 
had no inventions on the list.
Countries with inventions on this list that are nevertheless excluded from our sample 
include Russia (9 inventions), Japan (2 inventions), Brazil (2 inventions), India (2 
inventions), Canada (2 inventions), and Hungary (1 invention). Their contributions were 
minor. They are left out of our sample intentionally to maintain relative homogeneity 
across countries. Russia and Hungary do not belong to Western Europe, and Russia 
became a communist country in 1917. Japan was essentially a closed economy until 
1854. Brazil and India were developing countries during our sample period. Canada 
didn’t become a unified country until 1867. Similarly, Australia didn’t become a nation 
until 1901 and is excluded. Other issues in Streit’s list include joint inventions, 
simultaneous inventions and inventions spanning multiple years.
Joint inventions: Streit (1954) gave the credit of inventing atomic pile in 1942 to both 
Italy (Enrico Fermi) and the US (Walter Zinn and Herbert Anderson). It is well known 
that the work was undertaken in Chicago and had nothing to do with Italy, although 
Enrico Fermi was from Italy. As a correction, it is only counted as an American
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invention in this case. This was the only joint invention in Streit’s list with inventors 
of different nationalities.
Simultaneous inventions: On the other hand, simultaneous or contested inventions 
conducted by different people in different countries were counted separately for all 
countries involved. For example, the invention of the jet engine went to both Italy
9 0(Campini Caproni) and Britain (Frank Whittle) in 1940 and 1941 respectively. 
Inventions spanning multiple years: When Streit (1954) lists an invention as spanning 
multiple years, say, 1892-1894, the invention time is uniformly set to the earliest year, 
i.e., 1892 in this case.
See Table 6 for a summary of data. Figure 12 provides a time series plot of the total 
number of annual major inventions from Streit (1954). Due to the subjectivity of 
creating major invention counts, we cannot infer whether the rate of invention has 
changed over time.
20 Other simultaneous inventions in Streit (1954) were “Vitamin C, synthesized” (US, UK and 
Switzerland) in 1930, “Automobile, gasoline, improved” (Germany, France, US and Austria) in 1892, 
“Aluminum electrolytic process” (US and France) in 1886, “Photograph, high speed” (UK and US) in 
1880, “Automobile, gasoline (contested)” (Germany and Austria) in 1875, “Rifling, gun” (Italy and 
Sweden) in 1846, and “Steam engine, high pressure” (US and UK) in 1799.
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Table 6
Sample Countries’ Major Inventions and Patent Laws
Country # o f Major Inventions 
during 1590-1900




Austria 1 8 1810
Belgium 0 2 1817
Denmark 0 1 1894
Finland 0 0 1898
France 15 93 1791
Germany 16 77 1815
Italy 6 14 1859
Netherlands 3 1 1817 (repealed in 
1869, reinstated 
in 1912)
Norway 0 0 1834
Portugal 0 0 1837
Spain 0 1 1820
Sweden 2 7 1834
Switzerland 0 9 1888
UK 32 145 1623
US 40 256 1790
Total 115 614 -
Source: Numbers o f major inventions during 1590-1900 are from Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia 
(2007). Numbers of major inventions during 1750-1950 are from Streit (1954). Population and GDP per 
capita (not listed here) are from Maddison (2001). Most patent law data are from Penrose (1951).
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Figure 12. The total numbers of inventions for all 15 
countries during 1750-1950. Data source: Streit (1954).
The Encyclopedia List of Major Inventions During 1590-1900
Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia (2007) provides a smaller dataset of major invention 
counts with a total of 115 major inventions during 1590-1900. A smaller dataset means 
that a more stringent standard is applied when selecting major inventions. Because of 
the subjectivity of what inventions to include (see more discussion below), this second 
dataset is used more as a robustness check. The results from these two datasets are 
remarkably similar, although they were created by different people for different 
purposes at different times. Figure 13 provides a time series plot of the total number of 
annual major inventions from Streit (1954).
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Figure 13. The total numbers of inventions for all 15 countries during 
1590-1900. Data source: Funk & Wagnalls New Encyclopedia (2007).
Patent Law Data
Most patent law data (i.e., when patent laws were first established) are from Penrose 
(1951), which include Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and 
US. Sources for the other seven countries are below.
Germany: Germany didn’t become a unified country until 1871. However, according to 
Penrose (1951), Prussia (which accounts for about 60% of the German territory) 
established its first patent law in 1815, Wurttemberg in 1836, and Saxonia in 1843. On 
the other hand, Khan (2006) shows German patent record starting as early as 1811. 
Lemer (2005) also uses Prussia to proxy for Germany. As a compromise, we set 1815 to 
be the year when Germany first established a patent law.
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Switzerland and the Netherlands: Data are from Khan (2006). The Netherlands is 
the only country in our sample that repealed its patent law in 1869 (first established in 
1817), and it reinstated it in 1912.
Finland: A patent law was first established in 1898, according to the International 
Encyclopedia of Laws (1999).
Denmark: According to the Danish Patent and Trademark Office, a patent law was first 
established in 1894. This was independently confirmed by a Danish intellectual 
property attorney, who gave me a reference in Danish: “Mogens Koktvedgaard and Lise 
Osterborg,” The Danish Patents Act, 2nd rev. edition, 1979, page 21.
Italy: According to an intellectual property attorney practicing in Italy consulted by e- 
mail, Italy established its first patent law in 1859 (Law No. 3731 of October 30, 1859).
Norway: According to an intellectual property attorney practicing in Norway consulted 
by e-mail, the first Norwegian patent law was established in June 1885. However, in 
1814 Norway became part of Sweden, which adopted a patent law in 1834. To be 
conservative, I set 1834 as the year when Norway established its patent law, since 
Norway had zero inventions on Streit’s list. Furthermore, Lemer (2005) also indicated 
Norway as having a patent law in 1850.
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GDP per capita and population data are taken from Maddison (2001) for years 1500, 
1600, 1700, 1820, 1870, 1913 and 1950. Exponential interpolation (i.e., assuming a 
fixed growth rate between two points) is then performed to fill in the interim years so 
that there are data for every year from 1590-1950. Being almost deterministically 
generated, these data are therefore not subject to the unit root problem that often 
plagues macroeconomic data.
Econometric Issues
Before we proceed with estimation, there are a number of econometric issues that we 
need to deal with first.
Does It Matter Whether Inventions Were Actually Patented?
Certainly many inventions were made before national patent laws were enacted, and 
many inventions were made outside the patent system even after patent laws were 
introduced. But we are interested in whether patent laws spur inventive activities. 
Theoretically, the existence of a patent law gives an additional option value to any 
invention (Pakes 1986). Without a patent law, an invention is only beneficial through 
secrecy. If the cost of imitation is low, then secrecy may not be effective. This is
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probably true for most of the mechanical inventions during the Industrial 
Revolution. With a patent law, an individual or a firm can choose to patent his invention 
or not. If he chooses not to patent, this does not mean that the patent law has no effect 
on whether he undertakes the research in the first place. He might intend to patent his 
invention at the beginning, but in the end find out that he would be better off to keep it 
as a trade secret. Therefore, it doesn’t matter whether inventions were actually patented 
or not in our sample.
Endogeneity and Omitted Variables
Whether and when a country chooses to enact a patent law is certainly endogenous, and 
this is a potentially serious issue. For example, countries that are more inventive might 
choose to establish their patent laws earlier. In that case, causation would go from 
invention rates to patent laws, not vice versa. The patent law dummy is obviously a 
government policy variable. Then Dani Rodrik’s critique, “Why We Learn Nothing 
from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies,” due to the endogeneity of government 
policies, applies (Rodrik, 2005).
Lemer (2002) found that political systems and legal traditions played important roles in 
shaping national patent laws in his 60-country sample over 150 years. Citing historical 
records, Moser (2005b) indicated that patent systems were initially adopted in a 
relatively ad hoc manner, and the influence of innovation on patent laws was limited. In
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our specific setting, this endogenous variable patent law is a special dummy 
variable, a nondecreasing sequence of zeros and ones.21 Then only the exact timing of 
patent law enactment matters, which is a large random event or at least not tied to a 
country’s inventiveness. For example, the British patent statute of 1623 was largely a 
byproduct of restraining the monarch’s arbitrary authority of granting monopolies. 
America adopted its first patent law in 1790, as mandated by its 1787 constitution. The 
French revolution (itself a random event) gave birth to the first French patent law in 
1791 and spread the influences of French laws throughout Europe. The Netherlands’ 
unique case -  a patent law first established in 1817, repealed in 1869, and reinstated in 
1912 -  shows that the timing of enacting a patent law is more dependent on the current 
political tides than the stages of economic development. Therefore, at least we have 
reasons to believe that the issue of endogeneity is not so severe. However, this is still a 
potential limitation of this study, and it would be desirable if an instrumental variable 
could be found in future research.
Furthermore, there are certainly omitted variables related to invention rates that aren’t 
included, such as scientific development, education, and other invention-related 
institutions, such as copyright laws, trade secret laws, etc. To the extent that these 
omitted variables are correlated with the patent law dummy, then our estimate would 
not be consistent. We partially circumvent this problem by including only the US and 
14 Western European countries in our sample in the hope that the state of scientific 
development and other legal and institutional aspects were relatively homogeneous
21 The only exception is the Netherlands, since it abolished its patent law during 1869-1912.
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among these countries. Essentially, we are conditioning on these omitted variables.
Also, we use a fixed effects model to account for these individual country differences, 
which is consistent since the observation periods are large (311 and 201 years 
respectively).
Subjectivity of Counting Major Inventions
Certainly subjectivity is a concern for any man-made list of major inventions. For 
example, since Streit (1954) created his list to prove that free countries were more 
innovative, it is possible that he intentionally or unintentionally undercounted 
innovations from not-so-free countries. However, since all 15 countries in our sample 
are “free countries” according to Streit’s standard, this should not be a problem. Since 
these two invention count datasets were not created to measure the effect of patent laws 
on inventions, it is unlikely that the authors would knowingly or unknowingly lower the 
selection standard to include more inventions from countries with patent laws. So it is 
unlikely to have any systematic bias on this regard. Last but not least, the results from 
these two datasets created by different people for different purposes at different times 
are very similar in pointing to a robust effect of patent laws on invention rates.
The Quality of Patent Laws
Certainly not all patent laws are the same. There were significant differences in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
contents and enforcement of patent laws across countries and over time, such as 
patent length, patent application fee, and whether prior examination is required. For 
example, the US patent law of 1790 was very different from the British patent statue of 
1623 or the French patent law of 1791. Within the US, the patent law was different 
before and after the 1836 Act (Smith, 1890). Lemer (2002) documented the differences 
of different national patent systems in many dimensions over time. Unfortunately, we 
can’t take into account variations in patent law quality in this panel data setting. As a 
remedy, these differences would be picked up by the country fixed effects model, 
through the fact that unobservables that do not change through time are accounted for in 
the fixed effect term.
Appropriate Regression Technique
Since the dependent variable is count data, ordinary least square is not appropriate to 
accommodate nonnegative data with a skewed distribution. The Poisson regression is a 
natural choice. A casual inspection of both invention datasets reveals that their sample 
variances (0.65 and 0.19 for Streit’s list and the encyclopedia list respectively) are 
significantly larger than their sample means (0.20 and 0.03 for Streit’s list and 
encyclopedia list respectively), which is inconsistent with the Poisson model with equal 
mean and variance.
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To deal with this overdispersion, we consider the negative binomial regression, 
which generalizes the Poisson regression to take into account cross-sectional 
heterogeneity. The derivation of the negative binomial regression comes from the error 
component model by assuming each country has its unique error term, hence it is a 
random effects model when it is not augmented with country dummies. The use of a 
Poisson regression with country dummies constitutes a fixed effects model. Finally, the 
use of a negative binomial regression with country dummies accommodates both 
random effects and fixed effects.
Since the negative binomial regression nests the Poisson regression as a special case, 
our strategy is to run negative binomial regression and then test whether the model can 
be reduced to the Poisson regression by a likelihood ratio test. We ran a pooled 
regression as a benchmark (which is strongly rejected by the data). Both the Poisson 
and binomial regressions are carried out through maximum likelihood estimation.
The Effect of Patent Laws on Inventions: Regression Results
Table 7 reports regression results for the Streit’s list. In all the regression specifications, 
the patent law dummy and the log of GDP have positive signs and are significant at the 
1% level and appear to be very robust. In all specifications, the coefficient estimates for 
the log of GDP are within the theoretical range of 0 < p  < 1 mentioned earlier.
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Table 7
Regression Results for 614 Inventions During 1750-1950













Fixed & Random Dropped 
(Negative Binomial) UK & US
Constant -9.60(.33)** -2.80(.34) ** -10.15(.36) ** -2.77(.35) ** -.63(.99)
Log(GDP) 0.68(.03) ** 0.17(.03) ** 0.74(.04) ** 0.17(.03) ** -. 12(. 10)
Law 1.11(.22) ** 1.24(.22) ** 1.01 (.22) ** 1.23(.22) ** 1.39(.29)**
Austria -2.99(.36) ** -2.98(.36) ** -2.61(.40) **
Belgium -4.41 (.71) ** -4.40(.71) ** -3.92(.72) **
Denmark -4.53(1.00) ** -4.53(1.00) ** -4.23(1.02) **
Finland -16.57(. 15) ** -17.04(.15) ** -17.62(.30) **
France -,96(.13) ** -,94(.13) ** -
Germany -1.07(0.15)** -1.06(.15) ** -.07(.17)
Italy -2.49(.27) ** -2.46(.27) ** -1.55(.28) **
Netherlands -4.86(1.00) ** -4.84(1.00) ** -4.4(1.06) **
Norway -16.97(.14) ** -17.41(. 15) ** -17.95(.33) **
Portugal -17.15(. 13) ** -17.50(. 14) ** -17.86(,28) **
Spain -5.19(1.00)** -5.18(1.00)** -4.52(1.01) **
Sweden -3.00(.38) ** -3.00(.38) ** 2.63(.41) **
Switzerland -2.44(.33) ** -2.43(.34) ** -2.02(.39) **
UK -,68(.12) ** -.65(.12) ** -
US - - -
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.43 0.19 0.34 0.30
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% 
respectively. In the last column, “Dropped UK & US,” the sample size is 2,613.
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A likelihood ratio test strongly rejects pooled Poisson regression (first column in 
Table 7) in favor of fixed effects Poisson regression (second column in Table 7). 
Specifically, -  2(logZs -  logZ^) = 564.27, which is much greater than
^ (1 % ) = 29.14.
The random effects model with a negative binomial regression (third column in Table
7) gives similar coefficient estimates for both the patent law dummy and the log of 
GDP, as compared with the pooled Poisson regression. The 95% confidence interval for 
9 is [0.93, 1.70], which doesn’t include zero (9  = 0 corresponds to the Poisson 
regression). Therefore, we shall use negative binomial regression instead of the more 
restrictive Poisson regression (see Greene, 2003, Chapter 21).
Column 4 in Table 7 presents the fixed and random effects model, i.e., negative 
binomial regression with country dummies, which is our preferred regression model that 
accommodates both the random effects and fixed effects. The coefficient estimates are 
very similar to those from the fixed effects model (i.e., Poisson regression with country 
dummies). Again the data rejects the reduction to the restrictive Poisson fixed effects 
regression, since the 95% confidence interval for 9 is [0.13, 0.48], which doesn’t 
include zero (9  = 0 corresponds to Poisson regression).
A likelihood ratio test rejects the random effects model (i.e., negative binomial 
regression without country dummies) in favor of the fixed and random effects model. 
Specifically, -  2(logLR -  logLv) = 461.63 > X\a(1 %) = 29.14. Therefore, the presence 
of fixed effects and random effects are both supported by the data.
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Since both the United Kingdom and the United States contributed many inventions and 
they both established a patent law very early, one might wonder how much of our 
results are driven by these two countries. Therefore, we drop the UK and the US from 
our sample in the fixed and random effects model as a robustness check. Although the 
log of GDP becomes insignificant with the wrong sign, the patent law dummy is still 
significant at the 1% level.
Since there are many zeros in the invention count data (2635 out of 3015), one is 
naturally tempted to try the zero-inflated Poisson regression, in which case the patent 
law dummy becomes insignificant but still with a positive sign. The Vuong statistic 
(Vuong, 1989) is 24.99, which favors the zero-inflated model in a nonnested test. A 
zero-inflation negative binomial regression yields similar results with Vuong statistic 
being 39.29. These results are understandable, since in zero-inflated regressions the 
probability of zero occurring doesn’t depend on the covariates. So we are only left with 
380 nonzero observations out of a total of 3,015 observations to explain. It does 
improve the model’s fit. But why would a country’s probability of having zero major
inventions in a particular year have a separate distribution that doesn’t depend on any
00covariates at all? This doesn’t make much sense theoretically. Hence, we do not take 
ad hoc zero-inflated models seriously.
22 The usual way to justify using the zero-inflated Poisson or negative binomial regression is that agents 
make decisions in two stages, first decide either zero or nonzero, then decide how many if  nonzero in the 
first stage. This scenario clearly doesn’t apply here.
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Table 8 reports regression results for the encyclopedia list, which are essentially parallel 
with the results from Streit’s list. In fact the coefficient estimates are pretty similar 
across datasets. Again, in all regression specifications, the patent law dummy and the 
log of GDP have positive signs and are significant at 5% level or 1% level.
A likelihood ratio test strongly rejects a pooled Poisson regression (first column in 
Table 8) in favor of a fixed effects Poisson regression (second column in Table 8). 
Specifically, -  2(logLR -  logL^) -  69.70, which is much greater than ;f,24(l%) = 29.14.
The random effects model with a negative binomial regression (third column in Table
8) gives similar coefficient estimates for both the patent law dummy and the log of 
GDP, as compared with the pooled Poisson regression. The 95% confidence interval for 
6 is [0.33, 2.40], which doesn’t include zero (0 = 0 corresponds to the Poisson 
regression). Therefore, the negative binomial regression is favored against the Poisson 
regression.
Column 4 in Table 8 presents the fixed and random effects model, i.e., negative 
binomial regression with country dummies, which is our preferred regression model that 
accommodates both the random effects and fixed effects. The coefficient estimates are 
very similar to those from the fixed effects model (i.e., Poisson regression with country 
dummies). Again the data rejects the reduction to the restrictive Poisson fixed effects
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regression, since the 95% confidence interval for 0 is [0.10, 1.53], which doesn’t 
include zero (0 = 0 corresponds to the Poisson regression).
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Table 8
Regression Results for 115 Inventions During 1590-1900









Fixed & Random 
(Negative Binomial)
Dropped
U K & U S
Constant -7.04(.32)** -4.46(.35)** -7.06(.32)** -4.49(.35)** 64(1.23)**
Log(GDP) 1.06(.09)** ,69(.08)** 1.07(.09)** .71(.09)** .28(.39)
Law .85(.28)** .64(.30)* ,84(.28)** .62(.30)* 1.13(.52)*
Austria -2.59(1.03)* -2.57(1.03)* -2.03(1.42)
Belgium -17.55(.23)** -18.28(.23)** -17.97(.78)**
Denmark -15.62(.32)** -17.46(.32)** -■17.23(1.10)**
Finland -14.38(.35)** -16.98(.35)** -1[6.94(1.38) **
France -1.40(.33)** -1.41(.33)** -
Germany -1.18(.30)** -1.19(.30)** .21(.36)
Italy -1.84(.43)** -1.84(.43)** -.48(.47)
Netherlands -1.52(.59)** -1.49(.59)* -.80(.79)
Norway -16.61(.32)** -17.30(.33)** -7.37(1.36) **
Portugal -17.92(.28)** -17.82(.28)** - 17.69(1.03)**
Spain •19.35(.21)** -18.82(.21)** -18.31(.47)**
Sweden -1.57(.75)* -1.54(.75)* -1.12(1.12)
Switzerland ■16.43(.29)** -17.76(.29)** -17.42(.93)**
UK -,79(.24)** -,78(.24)** -
US - - -
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.35 0.26 0.32 0.25
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% 
respectively. In the last column, “Dropped UK & US,” the sample size is 4,043.
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A likelihood ratio test rejects the random effects model (i.e. negative binomial 
regression without country dummies) in favor of the fixed and random effects model. 
Specifically, -  2(logLR -  logLv ) = 65.34 > ^,24(1%) = 29.14. Therefore, the presence of 
both fixed effects and random effects is supported by the data.
Again we drop the UK and the US from our sample in the fixed and random effects 
model as a robustness check in the fixed and random effects model. As reported in the 
last column of Table 8, although the log of GDP becomes insignificant (this time with a 
right sign), the patent law dummy is still significant at 5% level.
In summary, this study presents (to our knowledge) the first cross-country statistical 
evidence of the importance of patent laws on innovation. Two datasets of major 
invention counts for the US and 14 Western European countries during 1750-1950 and 
1590-1900 respectively were used to assess the impact of patent laws on invention rates. 
Both datasets point to a significant positive effect of patent laws on invention rates, 
after controlling for each country's economy size. This result is robust in different 
specifications of cross-country fixed effects and/or random effects models and dropping 
the UK and the US from the sample. Regarding the fact that these two invention count 
datasets were created by different people for different purposes at different times, it is 
remarkable that they produce essentially the same results.
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Could James Watt Be a Chinese? A Case Study
In this section, I ask a hypothetical question: Could James Watt (1736 -  1819) be a 
Chinese? Or if James Watt were bom in China, would he still be able to invent the 
steam engine? The importance of Watt’s invention of the steam engine for the Industrial 
Revolution is hard to overestimate. Without the steam engine, the Industrial Revolution 
might have been delayed or much less dramatic. The following biographic materials 
were mostly taken from Marshall (1925).
Before attending grammar school, James Watt received home education from his 
mother because his constitution was considered too delicate. In 1754 Watt went to 
Glasgow to learn the trade of mathematical instrument maker for a year and then went 
to London as a clockmaker’s apprentice for another year before returning to Glasgow to 
set up his own shop. In 1763, Watt’s life made a historical turn when he was asked to 
fix a Newcomen steam engine for the University of Glasgow. Apparently, his 
revolutionary ideas came into being following his repair work. Conceiving an idea may 
cost next to nothing, but putting it to work can be the most challenging thing. As 
recounted vividly by Marshall (1925):
For two days he enjoyed the exquisite pleasure of building engines in the world 
of his imagination... .His difficulties began when he started to make a working 
model. A hundred tiresome problems of detail were revealed which had not 
existed in the immaterial world of his imagination. (Ch. 5)
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All these take money. James quickly found himself borrowing from his friends and 
running heavily into debts.
He wanted a few thousand pounds to complete his experiments, build a factory, 
and manufacture the engines that should persuade the world that he was right. 
The profits would eventually cover this outlay, but he wanted to spend those 
profits in advance. (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 5)
His first chance came in 1766, when he went into a partnership with John Roebuck, a 
leading businessman and inventor in his own right. Roebuck “undertook to pay his 
outstanding debt of 1,000 pounds and to bear all future cost of experiments and of 
securing a patent. In return for this he was to have two-thirds of the property of the 
invention” (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 5). Obviously, Roebuck was fully aware that his 
partner’s invention would be a “property” to be clearly defined and protected by law. 
Without an effective patent protection, the invention would be worthless, and Roebuck 
certainly would not have entered into such a partnership.
With Roebuck’s critical financial support, in 1769 Watt finally patented his epochal 
invention. However, before they could produce a commercial steam engine, “the engine 
was now costing him everything, but it brought him no income.” The arduous path from 
an ingenious patent to a marketable product dragged on for years -  only to see Roebuck 
go bankrupt in 1773 during the British trade depression. Watt took on a side job as a 
canal surveyor in order to support his wife and two children. Suddenly, their patent 
seemed worthless, not even recognized by Roebuck’s creditors. When things appeared
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really bad, Watt wrote to his friend, “Of all things in life there is nothing more 
foolish than inventing” (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 5).
In 1774, Watt’s second chance came when he formed his second partnership with 
Matthew Boulton, an extremely successful manufacturer. Their contract stipulated:
Boulton held two-thirds of the property in the patent, and undertook to pay all 
expenses of past and future experiments... .The profits were to be divided in the 
proportions of two-thirds to him and one third to Watt. (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 7)
However, there was another serious hurdle in their joint venture: “The patent was for 
fourteen years, and six of these had passed before he was in a position to execute a 
single order” (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 6). They decided to ask the Parliament for an 
extension, which was granted in 1775 into a total of 25 years. “Boulton now felt that he 
could safely embark on manufacture on an extensive scale” (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 6). In 
1776, their first steam engine was sold. However, it was only by 1783 that their steam 
engine business became profitable.
Twenty years had passed since Watt conceived the idea of his engine, forty 
thousand pounds had been invested by Boulton in the development of the 
invention, and at last they were beginning to reap the fruits of their labors. 
(Marshall, 1925, Ch. 7)
Even with a readily enforceable British patent law, “there had always been trouble from 
pirates who picked up some knowledge of the principle of Watt's engines and made use 
of it without recognizing their debt to the inventor” (Marshall, 1925, Ch. 8). The
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importance of patent protection was highlighted when James Watt actually fought 
with a pirate of his patent (one of their former employees) in court in 1793 and won.
The very fact that James Watt’s invention was patentable made his two partnerships 
possible. In both partnerships, James Watt was able to secure financial support only by 
selling a significant share of his patent. If patent protection were not credible, neither 
James Watt nor Roebuck nor Boulton would spend their enormous time, effort and 
money on this gigantic project. It took James Watt ten years of hard labor, two 
partnerships, an extension of patent by the Parliament and tens of thousands of pounds 
to complete his invention and move it onto the market. In short, missing an enforceable 
patent law, James Watt would not have invented the steam engine if he was bom in 
contemporary China.
China’s (Lack of) Legal Tradition
Then the question becomes why a patent law and a legal system in general didn’t 
develop in China. This question is at least as profound as the Needham puzzle. Lin 
(1995) lamented why the curriculum of Chinese civil service exams did not include 
science and mathematics, besides moral classics and literature. We may well wonder 
why there wasn’t profession legal training in the curriculum. After all, a major day-to-
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day function of Mandarin officials was to judge civil and criminal cases instead of 
conducting or overseeing scientific research. Reading moral classics and literature was a 
poor preparation for this legal function.
Path dependence may be an important reason for the insignificance of laws in Chinese 
society. After an unauspicious start in the debate between Confucians and Legalists 
culminating in the heavy-handed but short-lived Ch’in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.), the 
reputation of “rule of law” seemed to have been forever tarnished, and China was 
locked in a preference of “rule of morality” over rule of law, with the latter being only 
supplementary. The dominant Confucian philosophy emphasizes “obligations” over 
“rights,” which is a key concept in the Western legal tradition.
Certainly there were laws on paper, but they were always secondary to moral persuasion 
and far from being a central organizing principle of the Chinese society. Chen (1969) 
argued that “pre-modem Chinese criminal and administrative codes, legal 
commentaries, and case collections are unsurpassed in quantity and comprehensiveness 
by the legal heritage of any nation” (p. 275). However, Chen (1969) went on to admit, 
“Nevertheless, in Chinese legal scholarship, there is not much creative thinking; 
systematic and analytical treatises are rare” (p. 275).
Harrison (1968) commented on the two features of the Chinese judiciary system:
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I) The vast number of substatutes (1,892 by 1870) resulted in some 
inconsistencies between statutes and substatutes, and between various 
substatutes.. ..The punishment, of course, varied depending on which statute the 
criminal was supposed to have violated. II) Each case was decided on its own 
merits without automatic references to established precedents, (p. 868)
Bernhardt and Huang (1994) noted “how infrequently court directives make explicit and 
specific references to statutes (lu) or substatutes (//)” (p. 125) because magistrates 
“generally preferred the civil cases be resolved out of court” (p. 138). The judges were 
poorly trained bureaucrats, and there were no lawyers or jury, prompting Victor Li 
(1978) to title his book aptly as Law Without Lawyers.
The lack of formal institutions in China may not be as critical as far as market 
integration is concerned. Ma (2004) showed that two of China’s largest merchant 
groups originating in Huizhou and Shanxi were able to successfully engage in long­
distance trading or banking through a network of lineage unions or collective 
punishments for fraudulent behaviors, etc. However, for any potential inventor to make 
a sizable commitment to R & D investment, this is nearly impossible without a specific 
definition and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
In an empirical study of 60 countries over a 150-year period, Lemer (2002) showed that 
a country’s legal tradition matters as a determinant of its patent policy even after 
controlling for national income and democratic institutions.
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If we broaden our view to include the whole world and not just China vis-a-vis 
Western Europe, then we see that traditional institutions in developing countries around 
the world often did not evolve into more complex, impersonal, formal and legal 
institutions as in Europe. So the question is not so much why China couldn’t develop 
formal institutions, but rather why Western Europe could and did. The question of why 
impersonal, formal, and legal institutions failed to develop in China is profound and still 
largely unanswered (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). This is a critical area where 
serious future research needs to be undertaken.
Conclusion
The Industrial Revolution depended critically on systematic incentives given to 
inventors. The enactment of patent laws was a quantum leap by Western Europe to base 
its inventive activities on deliberate R & D instead of casual learning by doing. This 
resulted in sustained and accelerated technological progress. Although China led the 
world technologically in ancient times due to its population size and greater chance of 
learning by doing, it was far from enough to generate an Industrial Revolution and 
quickly ran into diminishing returns. The traditional Chinese society was characterized 
by rule by men or morality instead of rule by law. Without a formal legal tradition, it 
was difficult to enact and enforce the protection of intellectual properties.
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Certainly, the lack of sound legal institutions alone does not explain the complex 
phenomenon of why the Industrial Revolution didn’t happen in China. However, a 
central contention of this paper is that any meaningful discussion of this fundamental 
problem has to put the role of legal institutions at the center stage.
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APPENDIX A
SKILLED RETURN MIGRATION FROM US IN 1990
# Country 
o f Origin
Number of  
Return 
Migrantsf
Ratio of  
Skilled 
Migrantsf
Number of  
Skilled Return 
Migrants1







1 Argentina 835 54.93% 458.67 35,200 1.30%
2 Colombia 2,337 39.20% 916.10 63,799 1.44%
3 Dominican
Republic
2,860 22.60% 646.36 42,451 1.52%
4 Ecuador 1,193 35.37% 421.96 31,596 1.34%
5 El Salvador 1,641 16.87% 276.84 44,465 0.62%
6 Guatemala 846 20.17% 170.64 25,686 0.66%
7 India 5,275 75.08% 3,960.47 228,270 1.73%
8 Iran 3,998 69.93% 2,795.80 105,526 1.68%
9 Jamacia 2,539 41.67% 1,058.00 66,633 1.59%
10 Korea 8,425 53.30% 4,490.53 201,460 2.23%
11 Mexico 20,068 12.66% 2,540.61 347,218 0.73%
12 Peru 526 50.49% 265.58 43,583 0.61%
13 Philippines 11,242 67.69% 7,609.71 493,074 1.54%
14 Trinidad & 
Tobago
842 46.09% 388.08 30,330 1.28%
f  Source: Mulder et al. (2002), Table 5.
J Source: Carrington and Detragiache (1998).
1. Number o f skilled return migrants = Number of skilled migrants x Ratio o f skilled migrants.
2. Rate o f skilled return migration = number o f skilled return migrants stock o f skilled immigrants
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
APPENDIX B
MACROECONOMIC DATA DURING 1990-2000
# Country 
o f Origin








o f  Schooling 
1990**
1 Argentina 7218.69 11006.46 0.0431 7.77
2 Colombia 4934.49 5383.46 0.0087 4.37
3 Dominican
Republic
3159.75 5270.16 0.0525 4.3
4 Ecuador 3773.98 3467.66 -0.0084 5.94
5 El Salvador 3524.55 4435.17 0.0233 3.58
6 Guatemala 3597.8 3914.2 0.0085 2.6
7 India 1674.96 2478.92 0.04 3.68
8 Iran 3881.75 5994.59 0.0444 3.36
9 Jamacia 4100.42 3692.59 -0.0104 4.55
10 Korea 9952.39 15875.84 0.0478 9.25
11 Mexico 7333.8 8762.34 0.018 5.87
12 Peru 3584.69 4589.04 0.025 5.92
13 Philippines 3009.32 3425.04 0.013 7.07
14 Trinidad & 
Tobago
8765.17 11175.2 0.0246 6.66
* Source: Penn World Table, Mark 6.1. Available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. Accessed on 
July 20,2006.
** Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
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APPENDIX C
SKILLED RETURN MIGRATION FROM NEW ZEALAND IN 2001
# Country 
o f Origin
Stock o f  
Migrants!
Ratio o f  
Skilled 
Migrants!






Rate o f  Skilled 
Return 
Migration2
1 China 24,627 0.1546 3807 170 0.0447
2 Fuji 17,136 0.2119 3631 69 0.0190
3 India 12,220 0.1667 2037 41 0.0201
4 Malaysia 13,211 0.2135 2820 67 0.0237
5 Philippines 5,708 0.3434 1960 34 0.0173
6 Samoa 10,182 0.1300 1323 54 0.0408
7 South Africa 19,364 0.3387 6558 61 0.0093
8 South Korea 14,565 0.5873 8554 463 0.0541
9 Thailand 6,272 0.2647 1660 56 0.0337
f  Source: Statistics New Zealand. Available at www.stats.govt.n2/tables/tourism-migration-2001 .htm 
(Table 9.06), accessed on 10/10/06. Using perpetual inventory method, I added up all arrivals and 
subtracted all departures during 1981-2000 to generate the stock o f migrants in 2001.
X Source: Statistics New Zealand. Available at www.stats.govt.nz/tables/tourism-migration-2001 .htm 
(Table 9.02), accessed on 10/10/06.1 used the proportion o f “Administrators and Managers,” 
“Professionals,” and “Technicians” in the total arrivals in 2001 to proxy for the ratio o f  skilled migrants 
in the total stock o f migrants. Skilled return migrants are defined as the return migrants in the above three 
occupations.
1. Stock o f skilled migrants = Stock o f migrants x Ratio o f  skilled migrants.
2. Rate o f skilled return migration = Skilled return migrants Stock o f skilled migrants.
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APPENDIX D















o f Schooling 
2000****
1 China 3920 6600 1.1098 5.74
2 Fuji 4480 5960 1.0588 7.96
3 India 2340 3460 1.0814 4.77
4 Malaysia 8330 10320 1.0438 7.88
5 Philippines 4210 5300 1.0471 7.62
6 Samoa 5050 6480 1.0511 6.65
7 South Africa 9160 12120 1.0576 7.87
8 South Korea 17300 21850 1.0478 10.46
9 Thailand 6320 8440 1.0596 6.1
* Source: World Bank Atlas 2002, Volume 1. Available at www.worldbank.org under “Data & 
Research, ” accessed on 10/10/06.
** Source: World Bank Quick Reference Table. Available at www.worldbank.org under “Data,” then 
“Quick Reference,” accessed on 10/10/06.
*** The computed average growth rates o f  per capita GNI during 2000-2005 are certainly too high due 
to the fact that PPP dollars in 2000 were worth more than PPP dollars in 2005. However, we do not 
need to deflate PPP 2005 dollars since it would be multiplying a constant to each entry. For this 
reason, I do not subtract 1 from the annual growth rate.
**** Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
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APPENDIX E
SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN INVENTIONS FROM STREIT (1954)
1. Iron, coke for coal process (1750, UK)
2. Lightening rod (1752, US)
3. Cement, hydraulic mfg. of (1756, UK)
4. Lens, achromatic (1756, UK)
5. Spectacle, bifocal (1760, US)
6. Percussion (1761, Austria)
7. Chronometer, modem (1763, France)
8. Spinning jenny (1764, UK)
9. Spinning frame (1769, UK)
10. Steam wagon (1769, France)
11. Caterpillar tread (1770, UK)
12. Boring machine (1774, UK)
13. Spinning mule (1774, UK)
14. Electrophorous (1775, Italy)
15. Submarine (1776, US)
16. Mines, submarine (1777, US)
17. Saw, circular (1777, UK)
18. Water closet, improved (1778, UK)
19. Bicycle, earliest (1779, France)
20. Bridge, cast iron (1779,UK)
21. Ammunition, shrapnel (1780, UK)
22. Insemination, artificial, plants (1780, Italy)
23. Pen, steel (1780,UK)
24. Steam engine, compound (1781,UK)
25. Balloon (1782, France)
26. Steam engine, improved (1782,UK)
27. Balloon, hydrogen gas (1783, France)
28. Parachute (1783, France)
29. Steamship (1783, France)
30. Iron, puddling process (1784, UK)
31. Plow, cast iron mold boards (1784,UK)
32. Milling, of flour, 1st automatic (1785,US)
33. Loom, power, water (1785, UK)
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34. Propeller, screw (1785, UK)
35. Threshing machine (1786,UK)
36. Ship, iron (1787,UK)
37. Ammunition, explosive shell (1788,UK)
38. Fly ball governor, 1st technical use of feedback principle (1788,UK)
39. Nail-making machine (1790, UK)
40. Optical glass, homogenous (1790, Switzerland)
41. Printing press, rollers used (1790, UK)
42. Planing machine for wood (1791, UK)
43. Printing press, platen, power driven (1791,US)
44. Soda from salt (1791,France)
45. Cotton gin (1793,US)
46. Telegraph, visual (1793,France)
47. Gas lighting, city (1795,UK)
48. Pencil, graphite (1795, France)
49. Canning, food (1795,France)
50. Cement, “roman” (1796,UK)
51. Press, hydraulic (1796,UK)
52. Smallpox vaccine (1796,UK)
53. Carding machine (1797,US)
54. Plow, cast iron (1797,US)
55. Lithography (1798,Germany)
56. Lathe, screw-cutting (1799,UK)
57. Paper-making machine, continuous web (1799,France)
58. Steam engine, high pressure (1799,US)
59. Steam engine, high pressure (1799,UK)
60. Electric cell, copper zinc (1800,Italy)
61. Printing press, all iron (1800,US)
62. Rocket (1800,UK)
63. Mortising machine (1801,UK)
64. Safe, fireproof (1801,UK)
65. Photography, earliest recorded experiments (1802,UK)
66. Loom, steam powered (1803,UK)
67. Paper-making machine, improved (1803,UK)
68. Loom, pattern (1804,France)
69. Propeller, twin screw applied to navigation (1804,US)
70. Torpedo, marine (1804,US)
71. Electroplating (1805,Italy)
72. Warship, iron clad, proposed (1805,UK)
73. Knitting machine, latch needle in (1806,France)
74. Percussion cap and powder (1807,UK)
75. Steamship (1807,US)
76. Saw, band, for wood (1808,UK)
77. Paper-making machine, cylinder (1809,US)
78. Air conditioning, artificial ventilation (1811,UK)
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79. Shotgun, breach loading (1811,US)
80. Tunnelling, modem process (1811,UK)
81. Electric cell, storage (1812,Germany)
82. Printing press, rotary, first practical (1812, Germany)
83. Heliography (1814,France)
84. Kaleidoscope (1814,UK)
85. Locomotive, steam (1814,UK)
86. Newspaper, power printed (1814,UK)
87. Planimeter (1814,Austria)
88. Steam jet (1814,UK)
89. Meter, dry gas (1815,UK)
90. Bicycle, “hobbyhorse” (1816,France)
91. Knitting machine (1816,UK)
92. Lamp, miner’s safety (1816,UK)
93. Milling machine (1818,US)
94. Tunnel shield (1818,UK)
95. Auscultation, stethoscope (1819,France)
96. Diving suit (1819,UK)
97. Lathe, turning irregular wood forms (1819,US)
98. Plow, cast iron, standard (1819,US)
99. Calculating machine (1820,France)
100. Electroscope (1820,Germany)
101. Carborundum (1821 ,US)
102. Dynamo, electric current into mechanical motion (1821,UK)
103. Calculating machine, binary system (1822,UK)
104. Galvanometer (1822,Germany)
105. Photography, first experiments (1822,France)
106. Pen, steel, machine made (1822,UK)
107. Printing, multicolored (1822,US)
108. Steel alloy (1822,UK)
109. Type-setting machine (1822,US)
110. Ammunition, cylindrical-conoidal projectile (1823,UK)
111. Binoculars, modem (1823,Austria)
112. Engine, gas, vacuum (1823,UK)
113. Gases, liquefaction and solidification of (1823,UK)
114. Lens, lighthouse (1823,France)
115. Electro-magnet, forerunner (1823,UK)
116. Cement, Portland (1824,UK)
117. Railroad, commercial (1825,UK)
118. Limelight (1826,UK)
119. Aluminum, reduction of (1827,Germany)
120. Differential gear for road vehicle (1827,France)
121. Match, friction (1827,UK)
122. Turbine, hydraulic (1827,France)
123. Iron, hot air blast in mfg. of (1828,UK)
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124. Locomotive, tubular boiler (1828,France)
125. Spinning ring frame (1828,UK)
126. Urea, synthesis (1828,Germany)
127. Braille system for blind (1829,France)
128. Filtration, city water (1829,UK)
129. Sewing machine (1829,France)
130. Stereotyping, papier mache (1829,France)
131. Typewriter (1829,US)
132. Cannon, breech loading (1830,France)
133. Heat of the earth utilized (1830,France)
134. Loom, embroidery stitch (1830,Switzerland)
135. Dynamo, homopolar (1831,UK)
136. Electromagnet, improved (1831,US)
137. Match, phosphorous (1831,France)
138. Mowing machine (1831,US)
139. Sulphuric acid, contact process (1831,UK)
140. Chloral hydrate, a narcotic (1832,Germany)
141. Dynamo, heteropolar (1832,France)
142. Dynamo, significant improvement (1832,UK)
143. Propeller, screw, improved (1832,France)
144. Telegraph, electro-magnetic recording (1832,US)
145. Plow, steel (1833,US)
146. Reaper, reciprocating saw-tooth cutter for (1833,US)
147. Aniline dye in coal tar (1834,Germany)
148. Carbolic acid (1834,Germany)
149. Elevator, safety (1835,UK)
150. Revolver (1835,US)
151. Acetylene (1836,UK)
152. Morse code (1836,US)
153. Propeller, screw, improved (1836,US)
154. Rifle, breech loading (1836,Germany)
155. Road surfacing (1836,UK)
156. Dynamo, significant improvement (1837,UK)
157. Iron, galvanized, hot dip (1837,UK)
158. Telegraph, electric (1837,UK)
159. Shorthand (183 7,UK)
160. Daguerreotype (1838,France)
161. Drop hammer, steam (1838,UK)
162. Stereoscope (183 8,UK)
163. Babbitt metal (1839,US)
164. Photography, printing from paper negatives (1839,UK)
165. Rubber, vulcanized (1839,US)
166. Bicycle, with pedals and in metal (1840,UK)
167. Bridge, suspension, steel cable (1840,US)
168. Electric cell, carbon zinc (1841,Germany)
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
143
169. Insect control (1841,US)
170. Lamp, incandescent, carbon powder (1841,UK)
171. Pneumatic caisson (1841,France)
172. Seismometer (1841,UK)
173. Fertilizer, superphosphate (1842,UK)
174. Mercerized textiles (1842,UK)
175. Anesthesia, nitrous oxide (1844,US)
176. Telegram, first sent (1844,US)
177. Lamp, arc, first patent (1845,UK)
178. Lamp, metallic filament (1845,US)
179. Lathe, turret (1845,US)
180. Printing press, rotary, double cylinder (1845,US)
181. Tire, pneumatic (1845,UK)
182. Ammunition, metallic cartridge, practical (1846,France)
183. Anesthesia, ether (1846,US)
184. Guncotton (1846,Germany)
185. Rifling, gun (1846,Italy)
186. Rifling, gun (1846,Sweden)
187. Sewing machine, improved (1846,US)
188. Ammunition, pin cartridge (1847,France)
189. Building, iron (1847,US)
190. Nitroglycerin (1847,Italy)
191. Steam engine, regenerative (1847,Germany)
192. Steel beam (1847,France)
193. Alkyl-anilines (1848,Germany)
194. Gastrotomy (1848,France)
195. Hydrocarbons, synthesis (1848,Germany)
196. “Piqure” (1848,France)
197. Folding boat (1849,UK)
198. Rock drill, powered (1849,US)
199. Steam pressure gauge (1849,France)
200. Turbine, hydraulic, improved (1849, US)
201. Calculating machine, keyboard (1850,US)
202. Embroidery machine (1850,Switzerland)
203. Lamp, fluorescent (1850,Germany)
204. Paraffin oil, distillation (1850,UK)
205. Photography, collodion process, wet (1850, UK)
206. Anthrax bacillus (1850,France)
207. Benzyl alcohol, benzyl chloride (1850,Italy)
208. Ether manufacture (1850,US)
209. Fats and glycerides, synthesis (1850,France)
210. Iron molding machine (1850,UK)
211. Tractor, steam (1850,US)
212. Cable, first submarine, English channel (1851,UK)
213. Envelope-making machine (1851,UK)
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214. Lithophone (1851,France)




219. Refrigeration machine (1851,US)
220. Rhumkorff coil (1851,Germany)
221. Rifle, breech loading, improved (1851,US)
222. Airship, steam-powered (1852,France)
223. Fluorescence, discovered (1852,UK)
224. Gyroscope (1852,France)
225. Mining, hydraulic (1852,France)
226. Photography, half-tone printing process (1852,UK)
227. Telegraph, wire, duplex (1853,Austria)
228. Planimeter, polar (1854,Switzerland)
229. Rock drill, diamond (1854,US)
230. Ticker-tape machine (1854,US)
231. Gas burner (1855,Germany)
232. Match, safety (1855,Sweden)
233. Steel, pneumatic process (1855,UK)
234. Aniline dye, mauve, synthesis (1856,UK)
235. Lamp, coal oil, first (1855,US)
236. Rubber dental plate (1855,US)
237. Dynamo, shuttle winding (1856,Germany)
238. Furnace, regenerative (1856,UK)
239. Furnace, regenerative (1856,Germany)
240. Milk, condensed (1856,US)
241. Engine, electric ignition (1857,Italy)
242. Warship, ironclad, built (1857,France)
243. Boiler, feed injector for (1858,France)
244. Cable car (1858,US)
245. Photography, aerial (1858,France)
246. Binoculars, prism (1859,France)
247. Electric cell, storage (1859,France)
248. Spectroscope, prism (1859,Germany)
249. Dynamo, direct current, ring winding (1860,Italy)
250. Linoleum (1860,UK)
251. Pneumatic tube system (1860,UK)
252. Refrigeration, ammonia absorption (1860,France)
253. Sewing machine, shoes (1860,US)
254. Fertilizer, potassium (1860,Germany)
255. Rhinoscopy (1860, Germany)
256. Colloids (1861,UK)
257. Furnace, electric arc (1861,UK)
258. Gun, gatling (1861,US)
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259. Acetylene from calcium carbide (1862,Germany)
260. Powder, smokeless, one of first (1862,Germany)
261. Cardiograph (1863,France)
262. Sleeping-car (1863,US)
263. Solvay process, caustic soda (1863,Belgium)
264. Binding machine, grain (1864,US)
265. Bicycle, front wheel drive, “bone breaker” (1865,France)
266. Block signals, railway (1865,US)
267. Pneumatic tool (1865,UK)
268. Printing press, web-feeding (1865,US)
269. Steel, Martin process, fuse steel (1865,France)
270. Antiseptic surgery (1865,UK)
271. Refrigerator car, railway (1865,US)
272. Steam roller (1865,US)
273. Welding, electric (1865,US)
274. Cable, transatlantic (1866,US)
275. Steel, by open hearth (1866,UK)
276. Pasteurization (1866,France)
277. Rock drill, pneumatic (1866,US)
278. Torpedo, self-propelled (1866,UK)
279. Dynamo, direct current, self excited (1867,Belgium)
280. Hay carrier (1867,US)
281. Paper, wood pulp, sulphite process (1867,US)
282. Chlorine, Deacon process (1868,UK)
283. Concrete, reinforced (1868,France)
284. Dynamite (1868,Sweden)
285. Typewriter, first practical (1868,US)
286. Airbrake (1869,US)
287. Alizarin, synthetic (1869,Germany)
288. Voting machine, electric (1869,US)
289. Celluloid, pyroxyline (1870,US)
290. Oleomargarine (1870,France)
291. Lathe, screw cutting, fully automatic (1870,US)
292. Rectifier, crystal (1870,Germany)
293. Photographic dry plate, silver bromide, gelatin emulsion (1871,UK)
294. Railway, funicular (1871, Switzer land)
295. Tide predictor machine (1872,UK)
296. Coupler, automatic, railway (1873,US)
297. Typewriter, commercial (1873,US)
298. Insecticide, DDT (1874,Germany)
299. Telegraph, wire, quadruplex (1874,US)
300. Wire, barbed, machine (1874,US)
301. Reaper, self-binding, twine (1875,US)
302. Refrigeration machine (1875,Switzerland)
303. Stock ticker (1875,US)
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304. Wire, barbed, improved (1875,US)
305. Electric railroad (1875,Germany)
306. Automobile, gasoline (1875,Germany)
307. Automobile, gasoline (1875,Austria) <contested>
308. Fuse, lead (1875,US)
309. Glass, hardened (1875,France)
310. Pneumatic riveting (1875,US)
311. Vaseline (1875,US)
312. Bicycle, modem rear wheel drive, “safety” (1876,UK)
313. Cigarette, continuous machine (1876,US)
314. Harmonic analyzer, mechanical (1876,UK)
315. Photo engraving (1876,France)
316. Telephone (1876,US)
317. Torpedo, dirigible (1876,UK)
318. Engine, internal combustion, four-cycle (1876,Germany)
319. Microphone (1877,US)
320. Phonograph (1877,US)
321. Cultivator, disc (1878,US)
322. Lamp, incandescent, commercial, carbon filament (1878,US)
323. Anthrax vaccine (1879,France)
324. Cream separator (1879,Sweden)
325. Engine, internal combustion two-stroke (1879,Germany)
326. Tunneling, compressed air (1879,US)
327. Indigo, synthesis (1880,Germany)
328. Optical glass, improved (1880,Germany)
329. Elevator, electric (1880,Germany)
330. Photophone (1880,US)
331. Thermometry, precise (1880,France)
332. Photography, high speed (1880,US)
333. Photography, high speed (1880,UK)
334. Serum therapy (1880,France)
335. Button-hole machine (1881,US)
336. Camera, hand, plate (1881,US)
337. Color photography, trichromatic half-tone plates (1881,US)
338. Electric cell, wet, commercial (1881,France)
339. Submarine, improved (1881,Sweden)
340. Electric power, hydroelectric central (1882,US)
341. Electric power, steam engine (1882,US)
342. Printing press, 2 revolutions (1883,US)
343. Rayon (1883,UK)
344. Rayon, viscose (1883,UK)
345. Antipyrine (1884,US)
346. Calculating machine, accounting, punch card (1884,US)
347. Cocaine, local anesthesia (1884,Austria)
348. Machine gun, recoil operated (1884,UK)
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349. Paper, wood pulp, sulphate process (1884,Germany)
350. Pen, fountain, improved (1884,US)
351. Photographic film, roll (1884,US)
352. Rayon, nitrocellulose (1884,France)
353. Steam turbine, reaction type (1884,UK)
354. Steel alloy, manganese (1884,UK)
355. Television, Nipkow disk (1884,Germany)
356. Trolley car (1884,US)
357. Automobile, differential gear (1885,Germany)
358. Bordeaux mixture, a fungicide (1885,France)
359. Engine, internal combustion, tri-cycle (1885,Germany)
360. Linotype forerunner (1885,US)
361. Motorcycle (1885,Germany)
362. Aluminum, electrolytic process (1886,US)
363. Aluminum, electrolytic process (1886,France)
364. Photo-engraving, half-tone (1886,US)
365. Transformer, alternating current (1886,US)
366. Comptometer (1887,US)
367. Cyanide gold process (1887,UK)
368. Engine, internal combustion, small, high speed (1887,Germany)
369. Gramophone (1887,US)
370. Monotype (1887,US)
371. Record, cylinder (1887,US)
372. Calculating machine, recording, first practical (1888,US)
373. Camera, hand, roll film (1888,US)
374. Dynamo, split phase induction (1888,US)
375. Electric current, polyphase system (1888,US)
376. Meter, induction (1888,US)
377. Photographic film, celluloid (1888,US)
378. Tire, pneumatic, improved (1888,UK)
379. Diathermy, high frequency (1888,France)
380. Crown cork (bottle cap) (1888,US)
381. Radio coherer (1888,France)
382. Steel alloy, Harvey process, hardening steel esp. for armor plate
(1888,US)
383. Dial recorder (1889,US)
384. Motion picture camera (1889,US)
385. Steam turbine, impulse type (1889,Sweden)
386. Telephone, automatic (1889,US)
387. Engine, internal combustion, four-cylinder (1890,France)
388. Fingerprinting (1890,France)
389. Lamp, gas mantle (1890,Austria)
390. Rayon, cuprammonium (1890,France)
391. Time recorder (clock) (1890,US)
392. Tractor, first patent (1890,US)




395. Color photograph (1891,France)
396. Diphtheria antitoxin (1891,Germany)
397. Engine, internal combustion, forerunner of modem (1891,France)
398. Gun sight, telescopic (1891,US)
399. Petroleum cracking process (1891,UK)
400. Sero-therapeutic inject in man (1891,France)
401. Automobile, electric (1892,US)
402. Lamp, mercury vapor (1892,Germany)
403. Thermos bottle (1892,UK)
404. Wireglass (1892,US)
405. Automobile, gasoline, improved (1892,US)
406. Automobile, gasoline, improved (1892,France)
407. Automobile, gasoline, improved (1892,Germany)
408. Coke oven (1893,Austria)
409. Glass, fiber (1893,US)
410. Motion picture projector, kinetoscope (1893,US)
411. Diesel engine (1893,Germany)
412. Antitoxin (1894,Germany)
413. Color photography, ruled screen process (1894,UK)
414. Diphtheria antitoxin, improved (1894,France)
415. Motion picture projector, phantascope (1894,US)
416. Canning of food made safe (1895,US)
417. Hydrogen, liquid (1895,UK)
418. Oxygen from liquid air (1895,Germany)
419. Rayon, acetate (1895,UK)
420. X-ray (1895,Germany)
421. Photoelectricity, practical photo-electric cell (1895,Germany)
422. Airplane, experimental (1896,US)
423. Camphor, synthesis (1896,France)
424. Ore unloader (1896,US)
425. Plow, disc (1896,US)
426. Record, disc (1896,US)
427. Steam turbine, velocity compounded (1896,US)
428. Telegraph, wireless (1896,Italy)
429. Cloud chamber (1896,UK)
430. Airship, rigid (1897,Germany)
431. Cannon, quick-firing (1897,France)
432. Cathode tube, oscillography (1897, Germany)
433. Lamp, Nemst (1897,Germany)
434. Torpedo, radio (1897,US)
435. Welding, thermit process (1897,Germany)
436. Airship, non rigid, gas-powered ascent (1898,France)
437. Krypton (1898,UK)
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438. Magnetic recording (1898,Denmark)
439. Neon gas (1898,UK)
440. Submarine, improved (1898,US)
441. Aspirin (1899,Germany)
442. Automobile, magneto (1899,Germany)
443. Hydrogenation catalysts (1899,France)
444. Flotation ore extraction (1899,US)
445. Cellophane (1900, Switzerland)
446. Nitric acid by ammonia oxidation (1900,Germany)
447. Steel, electric process (1900,France)
448. Telephone, loaded line (1900,US)
449. Tractor, caterpillar (1900,US)
450. Motion picture synchronized with phonograph (1901,France)
451. Steel alloy, high speed (1901,US)
452. Telegraph, wireless, trans-atlantic signals (1901,Italy)
453. Rectifier, mercury arc (1902,US)
454. Telephone radio (1902,US)
455. Airplane, first flight (1903,US)
456. Airplane and aileron (1903,US)
457. Airship, station (Neuilly, Fr.) (1903,France)
458. Alternator, high speed (1903,US)
459. Barbital, sedative (1903,Germany)
460. Depth charge (1903,Sweden)
461. Glass, window, machine blown process (1903,US)
462. Glider, first flights (1903,US)
463. Glider, first flights (1903,Germany)
464. Dynamo, automatic acceleration (railway) (1904,US)
465. Telephotography, wire (1904,Germany)
466. Glass, safety (1905,UK)
467. Gyroscope, compass and stabilizer (1905,US)
468. Radio, direction aerial, horizontal (1905,Italy)
469. Radio tube, diode, first practical (1905,UK)
470. Glass bottle machine, automatic (1905,US)
471. Resins, synthetic, baselite (1906,US)
472. Blood transfusion (1907,US)
473. Color photography, auto-chrome process (1907,France)
474. Helicopter (1907,France)
475. Helium, liquid (1907,Netherlands)
476. Radio tube, triode (1907,US)
477. Lens achromatic fused bifocal (1908,US)
478. Novocaine (1908,UK)
479. Radio activity counter (1908,UK)
480. Silencer, firearm (1908,US)
481. Duralumin (1909,Germany)
482. Glass, laminated (1909,France)
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483. Salvarsan (1909,Germany)
484. Telegraph, wire, multiplex (1910,US)
485. Ammonia process (1910,Germany)
486. Hydrogenation of coal (1910,Germany)
487. Cotton picker, mechanical (1910,US)
488. Air conditioning, modem (1911,US)
489. Filter, electric (1911,US)
490. Lamp, neon (1911,France)
491. Seaplane (hydroplane) (1911,US)
492. Automobile, self-starter (1912,US)
493. Piezo-electric oscillator (1912,US)
494. Radio tube, high vacuum (1912,US)
495. Seaplane, flying boat (1912,US)
496. Telephone amplifier (1912,US)
497. Lamp, incandescent, gas-filled (1913,US)
498. Lamp, incandescent, tungsten, ductile (1913,US)
499. Motion picture, sound (1913,US)
500. Radio receiver, cascade tuning (1913,US)
501. Radio receiver, heterodyne (1913,US)
502. Radio tube, multi-grid (1913,US)
503. Radio tube, triode transmitter (1913,US)
504. Rubber, butadiene (1913,Germany)
505. Ship, electric propulsion (1913,US)
506. Gasoline, from liquefied coal (1914,Germany)
507. Photographic film, pan-chromatic (1914,US)
508. Tank, military (1914,UK)
509. Dynamo, hydrogen cooled (1915,US)
510. Glass, heat resistant (Pyrex) (1915,US)
511. Radio, the oscillator (1915,US)
512. Searchlight, high-intensity arc (1915,US)
513. Telephone, radio, long distance (1915,US)
514. Radio broadcasting (1916,US)
515. Steel, stainless (1916,UK)
516. X-ray tube (1916,US)
517. Engine, supercharger (1917,US)
518. Filter, wave (1917,US)
519. Sonar, detection system (1917,France)
520. Submarine detector (1917,US)
521. Mass spectroscope (1918,US)
522. Quinine, synthetic (1918,Germany)
523. Time system, self-regulating, electric (1918,US)
524. Lubricants, high pressure (1919,UK)
525. Mass spectrograph (1919,UK)
526. Radio altimeter (1919,US)
527. B.C.G. tuberculosis semm (1920,France)
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528. Microphone, high quality (1920,US)
529. Telephone, voice reinforcement (1920,US)
530. Autogyro (1920,Spain)
531. Glass plate, semi-continuous manufacture (1920,Germany)
532. Heat of sea, utilized (1920,France)
533. Television, first demonstration (1920,UK)
534. Television, first demonstration (1920,US)
535. Lacquers, synthetic (1921,US)
536. Power cable, oil filled (1921,Italy)
537. Anesthesia, ethylene (1922,US)
538. Gasoline, lead ethyl (1922,US)
539. Radar (1922,US)
540. Radio receiver, super-heterodyne (1923,US)
541. Rectifier, copper-oxide (1923,US)
542. Television, iconoscope (1923,US)
543. Foods, frozen process (1923,US)
544. Lens, fused bifocal (1924,US)
545. Loudspeaker, dynamic (1924,US)
546. Phonograph, orthophonic (1924,US)
547. Welding, atomic hydrogen (1924,US)
548. Photo telegraphy (1925,US)
549. Radar, pulse technique of ionosphere investigation (1925,US)
550. Gasoline from hydrogenation of carbon oxides (1925,Germany)
551. Methanol, synthesis (1925,France)
552. Radioactivity counter, improved (1925,UK)
553. Engine, internal combustion, compound (1926,US)
554. Differential analyzer (1927,US)
555. Color photography, commercial (1928,US)
556. Iron lung (1928,US)
557. Plasmochin (anti-malarial) (1928,Germany)
558. Radio beacon (1928,US)
559. Teletype (1928,US)
560. Television, image dissector tube (1928,US)
561. Coaxial cable system for high frequency signals (1929,US)
562. Electrostatic generator (1929,US)
563. Penicillin (1929,UK)
564. Refrigerator, low-boiling fluorine compounds (Freon) (1930,US)
565. Rubber, neoprene (1930,US)
566. Vitamin C, synthesized (1930,US)
567. Vitamin C, synthesized (1930,UK)
568. Vitamin C, synthesized (1930,Switzerland)
569. Cyclotron (1931,US)
570. Resins, melamine formaldehyde (1931,US)
571. Vitamin A2 synthesized (1931, Switzer land)
572. Electron microscope (1932,Germany)
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573. Polaroid (1932,US)
574. Rectifier, ignition mercury arc (1932,US)
575. Atabrine (antimalarial) (1933,Germany)
576. Dynamo, alternating current, high capacity (railroad) (1933,US)
577. Motion picture, three dimensional (1933,US)
578. Radio, frequency modulation (1933,US)
579. Sulfanilamide (1934,Germany)
580. Cortisone, compound E forerunner of (1935,US)
581. Radar, improved (1935,UK)
582. Waveguide (1936,US)
583. Jet engine (1937,UK)
584. Nylon (1937,US)
585. Memory machine (1938,US)
586. Radar, signals bounced back from moon (1938,UK)
587. Rubber, butyl (1938,US)
588. Shoran (1938,US)
589. Sulfapyridine (1938,UK)
590. Glass, silica (1939,US)
591. Loran (electronic navigation guide) (1940,US)
592. Jet plane (1940,Italy)
593. Jet plane (1941,UK)
594. Sulfadiazine (1940,US)
595. Toluene, synthetic (1940,US)
596. Vitamin, biotin, synthesized (1940,US)
597. Vitamin, folic acid, synthesized (1940,US)
598. Teleran (aviation) (1941,US)
599. Atomic pile (1942,US)
600. Guided missile (1942,Germany)
601. Electron microscope, desk type (1943,US)
602. Electron spectrometer (1944,US)
603. Atomic bomb (1945,US)
604. Rain-making, nucleation technique for (1945,US)
605. Streptomycin (1945,US)
606. Synchrotron and synchro-cyclotron (1945,US)
607. Transistor (1946,US)
608. Uranium, purification for atomic uses (1946,US)
609. Meson, production of (1947,US)
610. Scintillation counter (1947,US)
611. Aureomycin (1948,US)
612. Television, image amplifier tube (1948,US)
613. Neomycin (1949,US)
614. Contaben (1950,Germany)
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